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Abstract 
The aim of this thesis was to examine how experts learn using the theory of 
deliberate practice. Expert and intermediate Gaelic football players practiced 
kicking, with their learning being assessed between a pre-test and retention test. A 
novel method to measure the tenets of deliberate practice during the activity, as 
opposed to retrospectively, was used throughout the thesis. Findings support 
previous research on the mechanisms and strategies engaged in by experts as they 
aim to improve performance and how they differ to lesser-skilled individuals. In line 
with the theory of deliberate practice, in Chapter 2 and 3 the experts rated practice 
higher for effort and lower for enjoyment, as well as practicing a more relevant skill 
in Chapter 2, when compared to intermediates. Moreover, they improved kicking 
accuracy between pre-test and retention test, whereas the intermediate group did not. 
In addition, the thesis identified differences between the cognitive mechanisms of 
experts and intermediates that underpin their respective performance. Expert groups 
engaged in greater cognitive processing during (Chapter 2 and 3) and between 
(Chapter 3) practice sessions when compared to intermediates. Chapter 4 examined 
the impact of applying these expert cognitive processes to the deliberate practice and 
performance of a youth intermediate group. A training group practiced kicking with 
an intervention designed to increase cognitive processing, whereas a control group 
practiced kicking without intervention. Findings support previous research by 
providing evidence of the outcome of such an intervention on deliberate practice. 
The training group demonstrated greater cognitive effort and less enjoyment during 
practice and greater improvements in accuracy after practice compared to the control 
group. Overall, findings in this thesis support the theory of deliberate practice and 
extend the research on the role of cognitive processing in effective skill acquisition.  
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Thesis aims and hypotheses 
The aim of the following thesis was to examine the tenets of deliberate 
practice theory and self-regulation during the practice of complex skills by expert 
and intermediate performers from the sport of Gaelic football. In Chapter 2, the aim 
of the study is to examine the practice behaviours of expert and intermediate 
performers as they self-select to practice two complex motor skills. A novel 
methodology was used to measure the tenets of deliberate practice during a series of 
practice sessions to determine how practice characteristics differentiated groups. 
Expert and intermediate performers were free to self-select practice of two kick tasks 
that were categorised as either stronger or weaker skills for each individual. In line 
with deliberate practice theory, the expert group were hypothesized to practice and 
improve the task they were weaker at more frequently compared to the task on which 
they were stronger. In contrast, the intermediate group were expected to practice and 
The text originally presented here cannot be made freely available via LJMU 
Digital Collections because of copyright. The text was sourced at Ford, P. R., 
Coughlan, E. K., Hodges, N. J., & Williams, A. M. (2015). Deliberate practice in 
sport. In J. Baker and D. Farrow (Eds.), Routledge Handbook of Sport Expertise, 
pp. 347-362. Routledge: UK. 
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improve the task they were stronger at more often compared to the task on which 
they were weaker. Because of this difference in skill practiced, it was expected that 
the expert group would experience the tenets of deliberate practice to a greater 
extent, including greater effort and reduced enjoyment, when compared to the 
intermediate group. 
The aim of the study in Chapter 3 was to examine deliberate practice theory 
and self-regulation in expert and intermediate performers as they practice and reflect 
on a task they identified as requiring improvement. Participants identified and 
practiced kicking with their non-dominant foot across three practice sessions 
between a pre-, post-, and retention-test in an attempt to improve performance. 
Objective measures of cognitive effort and enjoyment from deliberate practice theory 
were recorded during practice, as well as self-regulation and reflective processes 
between practice sessions. It was expected that both groups would improve their 
performance on the kicking task, but that the expert group would make a greater and 
more permanent improvement in performance. The greater improvement for the 
expert group was expected to be associated with greater amounts of cognitive 
processing, including self-regulation and reflection between sessions, as well as 
lower ratings of enjoyment during practice and greater mental effort, when compared 
to the intermediate group.  
The aim of the experiment in Chapter 4 was to create an intervention to 
examine the effect of deliberate practice and self-regulation on youth intermediate 
performers as they practice a task they identified as requiring improvement. 
Participants practiced kicking with their non-dominant foot across four practice 
sessions between a pre-, post-, and retention-test in an attempt to improve 
performance. Objective measures of reflection and evaluation were recorded at the 
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pre- and retention-test stage for both groups. During and between practice sessions 
one group engaged in a structured cycle of self-regulation, whereas the other group 
practiced without this additional intervention. Objective measures of cognitive effort 
and enjoyment from deliberate practice theory were recorded during practice for 
both groups. It was expected that both groups would improve their performance on 
the kicking task, but the self-regulation group were expected to make a greater and 
more permanent improvement in performance. The greater improvement for this 
group was expected to be associated with greater cognitive processes of self-
regulation during and between sessions, as well as their rating practice sessions 
greater for mental effort and lower for enjoyment, when compared to the other 
group.  
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Chapter 3: An examination of the cognitive processes that underpin deliberate 
practice of a skill relevant to overall performance improvement 
  
The text originally presented here cannot be made freely available via LJMU 
Digital Collections because of copyright. The text was sourced at Coughlan, E. 
K., Williams, A. M., McRobert, A. P., & Ford, P. R., (2015). How experts 
practice: A novel test of deliberate practice theory. Journal of Experimental 
Psychology: Learning, Memory and Cognition, 40, 449-458. doi: 
10.1037/a0034302 
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Abstract 
Cognitive processes are thought to underpin deliberate practice before, during 
and after the activity. The aim of this study was to examine the cognitive processes 
of expert and intermediate performers during and between bouts of practice and its 
association to performance improvement. Expert and intermediate Gaelic football 
players practiced a kick they identified as relevant to improving overall performance 
during an acquisition phase and completed pre-, post-, and retention tests. During 
acquisition, participants rated practice for the deliberate practice tenets of effort and 
enjoyment. The expert group improved kicking accuracy between pre-, post- and 
retention tests. In contrast, the intermediate group improved kicking accuracy from 
pre-test to post-test, but not between pre-test and retention test. The expert group 
rated their practice as more effortful and less enjoyable compared to the intermediate 
group, whilst both groups rated the practice less enjoyable than leisure activity. The 
expert group demonstrated greater engagement in self-regulatory cognitive 
processes, such as reflection and evaluation, within and between practice sessions 
when compared to the intermediate group. Findings provide support for the theory of 
deliberate practice, as well as evidence of the cognitive processing that underpins 
how experts practice, learn and improve performance beyond its current level.  
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Introduction 
The acquisition and continued improvement of expert performance is 
required in most domains. Practice and engagement in other domain-specific 
activities contributes to performance improvement. The concept of deliberate 
practice was introduced by Ericsson, et al. (1993) as a specific type of practice 
activity that differs when compared to other types of practice. Deliberate practice is 
designed to improve key aspects of current performance, is effortful, and may not be 
inherently enjoyable or immediately rewarding (Ericsson et al., 1993). It has been 
shown to involve more cognitive processing compared to other activities (e.g., 
Coughlan, et al., 2014). However, only a few researchers have examined the 
cognitive processes employed by expert performers during practice and how these 
may differ to lesser-skilled performers (e.g., Cleary & Zimmerman, 2001), but never 
during deliberate practice. In this study, the cognitive processes employed by expert 
and intermediate performers engaging in deliberate practice of a complex perceptual-
motor skill are examined. 
Ericsson et al. (1993) examined the practice activities of four groups of 
violinists, three of which were based at the Berlin Music Academy. The groups in 
the Academy were the best violinists, good violinists, and music teachers. The 
violinists were selected into groups based on the level of competition they entered, 
the complexity of music they could perform and the expert opinion of music 
professors at the Academy. The fourth group were middle-aged professionals 
performing in world-class orchestras. Participants retrospectively recalled the 
amount of time spent in practice activities via interviews and diaries. The hours 
accumulated in solitary deliberate practice were positively related to the level of 
attainment of the musicians. By the age of 18 years, the middle-aged professionals 
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and the best violinists had accumulated 7,336 and 7,410 hours of solitary deliberate 
practice, respectively. In comparison, the good violinist group and the music teacher 
group had accumulated 5,301 and 3,420 hours, respectively. Subsequently, 
researchers examining performers in a range of domains have provided support for 
the positive relationship between deliberate practice and attainment (for reviews, see 
Baker & Young, 2014; Ericsson, 2004). 
Ericsson et al. (1993) required participants to rate a taxonomy of everyday 
activities (e.g., household chores, shopping, leisure, sleep) and musical activities 
(e.g., solo performance, group performance, practice alone, practice with others). 
Participants rated each activity on a scale of 1 to 10 for how relevant it was to 
improving their overall musical performance, how much effort they expended during 
the activity, and what level of enjoyment they experienced during it, ensuring the 
outcome of the activity did not influence their rating. The rating scores for each 
activity were collapsed across groups and compared against the grand mean for all 
activities. The only everyday activity that scored higher for relevance than the grand 
mean was sleep. In relation to the musical activities, practice alone was rated highest 
for relevance to improving performance. Practice with others, taking music lessons, 
solo and group performance, music theory and listening to music all rated higher for 
relevance to improving performance when compared to the grand mean. The musical 
activities that were rated higher than the grand mean for relevance to improving 
performance were rated higher than the grand mean for effort and not different to the 
grand mean for enjoyment, apart from listening to music and, for enjoyment only, 
group performance. Ericsson et al. (1993) concluded that engagement in deliberate 
practice will be rated as effortful, low in inherent enjoyment and highly relevant to 
improving performance. Researchers have generally supported these predictions 
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when examining deliberate practice in a range of domains e.g., in sport, (Coughlan et 
al., 2014), although there is some debate about the level of enjoyment from engaging 
in the activity (for a review, see Ford, Coughlan, Hodges, & Williams, 2015). 
Engagement in deliberate practice activity requires engagement in cognitive 
processing. Expert performers are thought to maintain cognitive control over their 
performances and practice by using working memory to monitor, plan, predict, 
reason, evaluate, and make other inferences towards improved future performance 
(Ericsson & Delaney, 1999; Ericsson & Kintsch, 1995, Sonnentag, 1998). Experts 
employ an analytical mind-set, utilizing feedback and feed-forward information or 
strategies to identify errors and make corrections to training and performance 
(Ericsson, 2006a). To do so, their working memory is expanded beyond 
conventional limits so that it can rapidly encode and retrieve domain-specific 
information. These dynamic memory representations that are online before, during, 
and after performance have been termed long-term working memory (LTWM, 
Ericsson & Kintsch, 1995).  
The planning, reasoning, and evaluating towards the improvement of future 
performance outlined in deliberate practice theory aligns with the characteristics of 
self-regulated learning (e.g., Zimmerman, 1986). Self-regulated learning involves 
forethought, performance, and reflection, engaging performers in metacognitive, 
motivational, and behavioural processes and activities (Zimmerman, 1986; 
Zimmerman & Campillo, 2003). Forethought involves the motivational beliefs and 
learning processes that precede and potentially improve practice, learning, and 
performance. Performance addresses the quality and quantity of practice, learning, 
and performance. Reflection involves the cognitive processes that occur during and 
following periods of learning, practice, and performance (Zimmerman, 2006). Self-
65 
 
regulation is a cognitive process linking domain-specific knowledge and 
metacognitive knowledge, enabling performers to consider plans made prior to 
practice, assess and adjust them during practice, and evaluate practice afterwards to 
begin the next cycle (Ertmer & Newby, 1996). Reflective, cognitive, and neural 
processes consolidate practiced skills to memory resulting in more permanent skill 
retention depending on the intensity of the process (Brashers-Krug, Shadmehr, & 
Bizzi, 1996).  
Researchers (e.g., Jonker, Elferink-Gemser, & Visscher, 2010; Toering, 
Elferink-Gemser, Jordet, Jorna, Pepping, & Visscher, 2011; Toering, Elferink-
Gemser, Jordet, & Visscher, 2009; Toering, Jordet, & Ripegutu, 2013) have 
examined the amount of self-regulation engaged in by skilled athletes. The self-
regulatory aspects they assessed were monitoring, planning, and evaluation (see also, 
Ericsson & Delaney, 1999; Ericsson & Kintsch, 1995); and in addition, effort, self-
efficacy, and reflection. They combined previously validated questionnaires 
assessing each aspect of self-regulation such as evaluation [Inventory of 
Metacognitive Self-Regulation (IMSR); Howard, McGee, Shia, & Hong, 2000] and 
self-efficacy (general self-efficacy scale; Schwarzer, 1993). These questionnaires 
contain Likert items on general traits related to self-regulation (e.g., “I correct my 
errors”) requiring scaled responses (e.g., “always” to “never”). The combined 
questionnaire was distributed to 159 elite and 285 non-elite youth soccer players in 
the Netherlands (Toering et al., 2009). Elite players were distinguished from non-
elite by having higher scores for their responses on reflection and effort, but not 
planning, monitoring, self-efficacy, and evaluation. In another study, Jonker et al. 
(2010) examined the responses of skilled youth athletes in the Netherlands across 
team and individual sports to the same combined questionnaire. International 
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standard performers demonstrated higher scores for reflection when compared to 
national standard performers, but there were no group differences for the other 
aspects of self-regulation (i.e., forethought and performance). Athletes from 
individual sports had higher scores for planning and effort compared to team sport 
athletes, but there were no between-group differences for the other aspects. Across 
both studies, higher skilled groups demonstrated greater self-regulation behaviours 
compared to lower-skilled groups. However, the questionnaires used in these studies 
measure general traits related to self-regulation that are open to biased responses and 
may not reflect actual behaviour as it occurs in the training environment. Moreover, 
the questionnaires do not assess the association between the self-regulation processes 
and the amount of performance improvement emanating from practice.  
Some researchers have measured self-regulation processes as they occurred 
during the activity (Cleary & Zimmerman, 2001; see also Kitsantas & Zimmerman, 
2002). For example, in Cleary and Zimmerman (2001), self-regulation processes 
were examined during the basketball free-throw practice of 15 expert, 13 
intermediate, and 15 novice performers. Participants were required to practice 10 
free-throw shots for approximately 10 minutes. When they either missed or scored 
two shots consecutively they answered a series of questions relating to their self-
efficacy, self-satisfaction, goal-setting, strategy choice, and attributions. These 
measures are similar, if not identical, to those of monitoring, planning, and 
evaluation used elsewhere (Ericsson & Delaney, 1999; Ericsson & Kintsch, 1995; 
Jonker et al., 2010; and Toering et al., 2009). Experts had greater self-efficacy 
judgements than the other groups. Following two consecutive misses during practice, 
53% of the experts attributed the misses to technique issues, in comparison to 15% 
of the intermediates and 13% of the novices. For the next trial following two 
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consecutive misses, 66% of the experts indicated that technique was their focus to 
ensure a successful trial, whereas only 20% of the intermediates and 7% of the 
novices did so. The expert group set more specific goals during practice than the 
other two groups. However, in this study, the researchers did not measure whether 
the practice and self-regulation led to performance improvement. Moreover, few, if 
any researchers have sought to measure the self-regulation processes that occur 
outside of practice bouts and how they are associated with performance 
improvement. 
In the current study, the self-regulatory process of reflection of expert 
performers is examined during and between bouts of practice and its association to 
performance improvement when compared to intermediate performers. The expert 
and intermediate performers played the sport of Gaelic football. Gaelic football is the 
national sport of Ireland with over 2,300 clubs for a population of five million. It is a 
field invasion sport consisting of 15 players on each team who score points by 
kicking a ball between opposition goalposts. The sport shares characteristics with 
rugby, soccer, and Australian Rules football. Prior to the study, participants each 
independently identified kicking with their non-dominant foot towards goal as the 
skill they most needed to improve. They practiced this skill across three practice 
sessions between a pre-, post, and retention-test in an attempt to improve 
performance. During the practice, objective measures of the cognitive effort and 
enjoyment from deliberate practice theory were recorded. A reflection scale 
(Toering, Elferink-Gemser, Jonker, van Heuvelen, & Visscher, 2012) was 
administered to measure their cognitive processes between practice sessions. 
According to deliberate practice theory, the expert group should rate their practice 
lower for enjoyment and greater for mental effort compared to the intermediate 
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group. They should engage in self-regulatory processes and reflect on their practice 
to a greater extent compared to the intermediate group. Their self-regulation should 
be more effective, involving more specific goal-setting relating to process and 
outcome goals. The participants whose self-regulation data is of greater intensity and 
quality should experience greater improvements in performance. Finally, although 
both groups were expected to improve kicking performance during the practice 
sessions, the expert group were expected to make a greater and relatively permanent 
improvement in performance as a result of their cognitive processes of self-
regulation. 
Method 
Participants 
An initial selection process involved 56 Gaelic football players (41 expert 
and 15 intermediate players) notating in rank order the three football skills that they 
believed would have the greatest impact on improving their overall competition 
performance. Expert players were contracted to a senior County-level Gaelic football 
team that plays at the highest level of the sport in the country. Intermediate 
participants played lower-level club Gaelic football. There were 45 players (30 
expert and 15 intermediate participants) who chose improving the kick from the 
hands (punt) with the non-dominant foot as the main skill they wished to improve 
and who, subsequently, became the participants in this study. The 11 expert players 
who did not choose improving the non-dominant kick as the main skill they wished 
to improve took no further part in the study. The 30 expert Gaelic football players 
were randomly divided into two groups of 15 players. One set of expert players 
formed the experimental group (n = 15; M age = 24.4 years, SD = 2.7, M playing 
years = 18.5 years, SD = 2.8). The other set formed a control group of expert players 
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(n = 15; M age = 24.6 years, SD = 3.5, M playing years = 18.9 years, SD = 3.5) who 
did not practice. A third group contained the intermediate players (n = 15; M age = 
24.4 years, SD = 2.5, M playing years = 18.2 years, SD = 3.1). Participants provided 
informed consent prior to the study and the research was conducted according to the 
ethical guidelines of the lead institution.  
Task and apparatus  
The skill that was chosen by the players to improve was the kick from the 
hands with their non-dominant foot. In this study, the task required participants to 
execute kicks toward Gaelic football goalposts (height = 10m, width = 6.5m, 
crossbar height = 2.5m) with the intention of getting the ball over the crossbar to 
register a score. Figure 3.1 shows the experimental set-up and a participant executing 
a kick. On each kick participants were awarded one point if the ball entered between 
the goalposts and over the crossbar, but zero points if it did not.  
 
Figure 3.1: Experimental set-up including Gaelic football goalposts. Participants 
could score 1 point when the ball went over the crossbar and between the goalposts, 
and 0 points for wide of the goalposts or under the crossbar. 
In Gaelic football, kicks from the hands are used frequently to pass the ball to 
a team-mate, restart play when a foul has been committed, and depending on the 
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location on the pitch and closeness to the goal an attempt on goal is made by the 
player to score a point. A 4m2 kicking zone was marked out with cones at a distance 
of 30m directly in front of the goalpost target. Fifteen standard round-shaped Gaelic 
footballs (O’Neill’s size-5 GAA All-Ireland footballs, Belfast, Northern Ireland) 
were placed on the ground immediately behind the kicking zone. A digital video 
camera (Canon Legria FS200, Canon, Tokyo, Japan) was used to record performance 
from 10m directly behind the kicking zone.  
Procedure 
The experiment consisted of a pre-test, an acquisition phase of three practice 
sessions, and a post-test, all of which occurred across a five day period, as well as a 
delayed retention test that occurred four weeks after the post-test (Shea, Lai, Black, 
& Park, 2000). The pre-test and first practice session occurred on the first day of the 
study period, whereas the second practice session occurred on the third day. The last 
practice session and post-test occurred on the fifth day, with the second and fourth 
days being non-practice days. The expert and intermediate groups engaged in all the 
tests and practice sessions, whereas the expert control group completed only the pre-, 
post- and retention tests.  
Prior to the pre-test, verbal instructions were provided to each participant 
regarding the pre-test and experimental procedures outlining the timeline of the 
study, the content of each session and the measures to be collected. The pre-test 
occurred two hours before the first practice session. It consisted of 10 kicks toward 
the goal from the hands using the non-dominant foot. Participants engaged in two 
familiarisation trials prior to the pre-test. Following the pre-test, each participant was 
informed of his score, which was calculated as a function of ten points. The post-test 
and the retention test were the same as the pre-test. Prior to each of the three practice 
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sessions in the acquisition phase, the participants were reminded of their pre-test 
score and were informed that the goal of the task was to improve their pre-test score 
(Boyce, 1992). Each practice session began with two warm-up trials. A practice 
session consisted of 15 kicks from the hands using the non-dominant foot towards 
the goalposts. The score achieved on every trial was recorded using hand notation by 
the lead experimenter during the practice, which was checked for accuracy against 
the video footage.  
Deliberate practice measures. Immediately following each of the three 
practice sessions, participants filled in two valid and reliable self-report measures to 
rate the effort and enjoyment tenets of deliberate practice for that particular session 
(Coughlan et al., 2014). The mental effort prediction was examined using the Rating 
Scale of Mental Effort (RSME, Zijlstra & Van Doorn, 1985). It is a continuous uni-
dimensional scale with eight points that range from 0 (absolutely no effort; 0%), 75 
(considerable effort; 50%), to 150 (extreme effort; 100%). The enjoyment prediction 
of the theory was examined using the Physical Activity Enjoyment Scale (PACES, 
Kendzierski & DeCarlo, 1991), which is used to examine enjoyment levels during 
physical activities. It consists of 18 Likert-scaled comments relating to the current 
activity with 11 of the comments reversed scored.  
In addition, participants were required to complete both the RSME and 
PACES scale immediately following engagement in a leisure activity of their choice 
that occurred on a separate day after the study period. The activity chosen was 
required to be engaged in frequently by the participant with the focus of leisure, 
rather than performance improvement. The intention was to use the data collected 
from the two measures of leisure activity to compare against the same measures 
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collected during the practice sessions. Table 3.2 shows the leisure activities chosen 
by the participants. 
Table 3.2: The activities chosen by the groups (expert, intermediate) for leisure. 
Leisure Activity Expert Intermediate 
Gym 1 1 
Soccer 4 2 
Motor-car racing 1 0 
Cycling 1 0 
Golf 3 3 
Rowing 1 0 
10-pin bowling 1 0 
Computer games 1 0 
Shooting 1 0 
Swimming 1 1 
Hurling 0 3 
Athletics 0 1 
Tennis 0 1 
Rugby 0 2 
Fishing 0 1 
 
Self-regulation measures. On the two non-practice days in the study period, 
participants completed the sport-specific Self-Regulation of Learning Self-Report 
Scale [(SRL-SRS), Toering, et al., 2012]. The questionnaire comprised of 18 
questions that related to the reflection processes that take place on the day after a 
practice session, such as “since yesterday’s training session I have thought back and 
evaluated whether I did the right things to become a better kicker”. It also includes 
evaluation process questions such as “in each of these training sessions I try to 
identify my strengths and weaknesses and I think about how I can improve these”. 
Each question contained a five point Likert scale ranging from “never” to “always”.  
The post-test was the same as the pre-test. It was conducted at the end of the 
last day of the five-day study period, two hours after the last practice session 
finished. The following day after the post-test, participants took part in a short semi-
structured interview containing relatively closed questions to measure the frequency, 
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intensity, location, and nature of their cognitive processes during the study period. 
The questions from the interview are shown in Table 3.3. The first question was 
‘This week did you find yourself thinking about the kicking training when you were 
not at training?’, which required a yes/no answer. Following a “yes” response to the 
first question, four subsequent questions were asked to accommodate deeper 
investigation (e.g., “If yes, what were you thinking of mainly?”). Following a 
negative response to the first question, one question was asked, which was “If no, 
was that intentional?”. 
 
Table 3.3: The questions asked in the post-acquisition semi-structured interview. 
Q1. 
This week, did you find yourself thinking about the kicking training 
sessions when you were not at training? 
Q2. If yes, what were you thinking of mainly? 
Q3. 
If yes, were these thoughts mainly intentional on your part or were they 
intrusions? If needed, could you expand further? 
Q4. If yes, when and where did this occur? 
Q5. If yes, for how long did these occur and how often in the day? 
Q.6 If no, was that intentional? 
 
Data Analysis 
Accuracy. Mean accuracy scores were calculated as a function of group, test 
and practice session. The calculation was from 10 kicks per test (pre-, post-, 
retention test), whereas for the practice sessions it was for 15 kicks per practice 
session. Accuracy scores from the tests were analysed using 3 Group (expert, 
intermediate, control) x 3 Test (pre-, post-, retention test) ANOVA, with repeated 
measures on the last factor. The practice session accuracy scores were analysed 
using a 2 Group (expert, intermediate) x 3 Practice Session (first, second, third) 
ANOVA, with repeated measures on the last factor. For all ANOVAs, Tukey HSD 
tests and the Dunn-Bonferroni adjustment calculation were used as post-hoc tests 
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where appropriate. Cohen’s f formula was used to calculate effect size for measures 
involving more than two means, whereas Cohen’s d was calculated for effect sizes 
involving two means (Cohen, 1988). Values equal to or greater than 0.2, 0.5, and 0.8 
represent a small, moderate, and large effect size, respectively.   
Deliberate practice measures. The data from each of the two deliberate 
practice scales (enjoyment, mental effort) collected immediately after the practice 
sessions were calculated separately into a single mean score for each participant that 
represented the amount of that variable experienced during the practice phase. The 
leisure activity ratings were also calculated into a single mean score for each 
participant that represented the amount of that variable (enjoyment, mental effort) 
experienced during that activity. The scale scores from the practice sessions and 
from the leisure activity were mathematically transformed into percentages to make 
interpretation, comparison, and plotting of data clearer. Percentage scores for each 
rating type (enjoyment, mental effort) were analysed in separate 2 Group (expert, 
intermediate) x 2 Activity (practice, leisure) ANOVAs, with repeated measures on 
the last factor. 
Reflection and evaluation. The data from the SRL-SRS reflection 
questionnaire that was collected on the non-practice days were calculated to give an 
overall mean score for each participant that represented the amount of reflection and 
evaluation they undertook across practice. The mean amount of reflection and 
evaluation was analysed between the expert and intermediate groups using an 
independent t-test. 
 The recorded interview data were transcribed verbatim using natural speech 
and syntactical markers (Hardy, Jones & Gould, 1996). The first question was “This 
week did you find yourself thinking about the kicking training when you were not at 
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training?”. Responses were coded as a frequency with one mark for a positive “yes” 
answer and one mark for a negative “no” answer. A chi-square test for independence 
with Yates Continuity Correction was conducted on the frequency of positive 
responses between the expert and intermediate groups. The second and third 
questions were about the nature of cognitive processes. The second question was “If 
yes, what were you thinking of mainly?”. Responses were analysed by the lead 
investigator using thematic coding. The interview responses were read and reread to 
identify themes, categories, and subcategories, with the number of statements within 
each of these recorded as a function of skill group. Themes, categories, and 
subcategories were discussed, verified, and agreed to be appropriate representations 
of the data by the project supervisors. 
The third question was “If yes, were these thoughts mainly intentional on 
your part or were they intrusions?”. Responses to the third question were coded 
separately for each thought-type as a frequency of participants, with one mark for 
‘intentional only’, one mark for ‘intrusion only’, and one mark for ‘both intentional 
and intrusion’.  
The fourth question related to the location where the thoughts occurred. 
Responses to the fourth question (“If yes, where did this occur?”) were used to create 
a location category (e.g., car, bedtime, home) and were coded as a frequency of 
participants in each group who responded that they reflected at that location. 
Responses were analysed by the lead investigator and the locations identified were 
agreed and verified to be appropriate by the project supervisors.  
The fifth question was about the frequency and duration of thoughts (“If yes, 
for how long did these occur and how often in the day?”). Responses to the fifth 
question were divided into two categories for both frequency and duration. After 
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initial inspection of the responses, the frequency category was divided into two 
further categories: lower frequency (≤ 2 times per day) and higher frequency (> 2 
times per day). The duration category was divided into two categories: shorter 
duration (≤ 3 min per day) and longer duration (> 3 min per day). Responses were 
coded as a frequency of participants in each group who reported frequency and 
duration within a category.  
A random sample of 10% of the interview data was re-coded separately by an 
independent investigator and the lead investigator to assess the objectivity of the 
analysis. Inter- and intra-observer agreements were calculated using the equation: 
(agreements / (agreements + disagreements)) x 100 (Thomas & Nelson, 2001). The 
inter-observer agreement value was 89% and the intra-observer agreement value was 
92%, which are greater than the 85% threshold required to show objectivity.  
The alpha level required for significance for all tests was set at p < .05. 
Results 
Accuracy 
Tests. Figure 3.4 shows mean number of points scored by the expert, 
intermediate, and expert-control groups across the pre-, post-, and retention tests. 
There were significant main effects for Group and Test in the predicted directions, 
and a significant Group x Test interaction. Post-hoc analysis showed that at pre-test 
the intermediate group (M = 1.5 points, SD = 1.0), 95% CI [1.0, 1.9] were less 
accurate compared to the expert (M = 4.9 points, SD = 0.7), 95% CI [4.4, 5.3] and 
expert-control groups (M = 4.7 points, SD = 1.0), 95% CI [4.3, 5.2], whereas there 
was no difference between the two expert groups. However, the expert group scored 
significantly more points on the post-test (M = 6.7 points, SD = 1.0), 95% CI [6.3, 
7.1] and retention-test (M = 6.4 points, SD = 0.8), 95% CI [5.9, 6.9] compared to the 
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pre-test and compared to both of the other groups. In contrast, the expert-control 
group accuracy scores were not significantly different across the three tests. 
 
Figure 3.4: Mean (SD) accuracy scores for the non-dominant kicks of the expert, 
intermediate and expert-control groups for the pre-test, post-test and retention test. 
 
Table 3.5 shows the statistical results for the ANOVA conducted on number 
of points scored during the tests.  
Table 3.5: Results of ANOVA on number of points scored for Group (expert, 
intermediate, control), and Test (pre-test, post-test, retention test). 
Variable &  MS dof F P Cohen's 
Comparison 
    
Effect Size 
Group 210.99 2, 42 157.61 0.00* 0.89 
Test 7.12 2, 84 13.87 0.00* 0.25 
Group x Test 4.83 4, 84 9.41 0.00* 0.67 
Note. ANOVA = analysis of variance 
* p <.05 
However, although the intermediate group scored significantly more points in 
the post-test (M = 2.1 points, SD = 0.8), 95% CI [1.7, 2.6] when compared to the pre-
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test, they were unable to maintain this improvement on the retention test (M = 1.7 
points, SD = 1.1), 95% CI [1.2, 2.2], where their accuracy scores returned to pre-test 
levels. 
Practice. Figure 3.6 shows the accuracy in terms of number of points scored 
by the expert and intermediate groups across the three practice sessions.  
 
 
Figure 3.6: Mean (SD) accuracy scores for the non-dominant kicks of the expert and 
intermediate groups for three individual practice sessions. 
Table 3.7 shows the statistical results for the ANOVA on number of points 
scored during the practice sessions. There was a significant main effect for Group in 
the predicted direction. The expert group were more accurate during practice 
compared to the intermediate group. The Group x Practice session interaction 
approached significance (p = .06). Post-hoc analysis showed the expert group 
improved accuracy significantly from the first (M = 7.8 points, SD = 1.2), 95% CI 
[7.1, 8.5] to the second (M = 9.1 points, SD = 1.2), 95% CI [8.4, 9.9] and from the 
second to the third (M = 9.9 points, SD = 1.4), 95% CI [9.2, 10.7] practice session. In 
comparison, the intermediate group significantly improved accuracy from the first 
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(M = 2.8 points, SD = 1.5), 95% CI [2.1, 3.5] to the second session (M = 3.6 points, 
SD = 1.6), 95% CI [2.9, 4.3], but not from the second to the third session (M = 3.8 
points, SD = 1.5), 95% CI [3.0, 4.6]. 
Table 3.7: Results from ANOVA on number of points scored for Group (expert, 
intermediate), and Practice (practice session 1, 2 and 3). 
Variable &  MS dof F p Cohen's 
Comparison 
    
Effect Size 
Group 694.44 1, 28 165.66 0.00* 0.41 
Practice 19.21 2, 56 23.34 0.00* 0.91 
Group x Practice 2.41 2, 56 2.93 0.06* 0.32 
Note. ANOVA = analysis of variance 
* p <.05 
 
Deliberate practice measures  
Figure 3.8 shows the percentage ratings for mental effort and enjoyment by 
the expert and intermediate groups across the practice sessions and the leisure 
activity. For enjoyment, there was a significant main effect for Activity, F1, 28 = 
243.61, p = .00, d = 4.17. Post-hoc analysis showed enjoyment was greater in leisure 
compared to the practice activity. There was a significant Group x Activity 
interaction, F1, 28 = 4.46, p = .04, f = .01. Post-hoc analysis reported that the expert 
group (M = 57.5%, SD = 2.2) rated the practice sessions as significantly less 
enjoyable compared to the intermediate group (M = 60.9%, SD = 2.2), whereas there 
was no difference between-groups for their enjoyment of leisure activity (M = 
83.5%, SD = 8.8). With respect to mental effort, there was no main effect for Group 
though the result did approach statistical significance (p = .07) in the predicted 
direction. There was a significant main effect for Activity, F1, 28 = 18.01, p = .00, d = 
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1.11. Post-hoc tests showed that mental effort was greater during practice compared 
to leisure activity.  
4a  
4b  
Figure 3.8: Mean (SD) scores recorded during the practice sessions and the leisure 
activity for enjoyment (4a – PACES) and mental effort (4b – RSME) for the expert 
and intermediate groups during the acquisition phase. 
 
Though the ANOVA showed no Group x Activity interaction, F1, 28 = 2.47, p 
= .13, f = .01; an independent t-test did show the expert group (M = 55.3%, SD = 5.6; 
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considerable effort, Zijlstra & Van Doorn, 1985) rated the practice sessions 
significantly greater for mental effort compared to the intermediate group (M = 
44.0%, SD = 6.4; rather much effort, Zijlstra & Van Doorn, 1985), t(28) = 5.14, p = 
.00, d = 1.9, 95% CI [6.8, 15.8]. The variance in the mental effort scores for leisure 
activity was relatively high (Expert SD = 15.3%, Intermediate SD = 18.3%), perhaps 
providing some explanation for these results. Some leisure activities, such as motor 
car racing (73.3%) required mental effort that was far higher than those recorded 
during practice, whereas others, such as fishing (0.0%) required far less mental 
effort. 
Reflection and evaluation  
The expert group (M = 66.2 points, SD = 9.3) scored higher on the SRL-SRS 
for reflection and evaluation between practice sessions compared to the intermediate 
group (M = 36.8 points, SD = 13.7), t(28) = 6.87, p = .00, d = 2.6, 95% CI [20.7, 
38.3]. The post-study interview revealed that there were also clear differences 
between groups in their cognitive processes between practice sessions. 
Q1: Did you think about the kicking training sessions when you were not 
at training? Every member of the expert group thought about the practice sessions 
when they were not at training compared to only nine members of the intermediate 
group χ2 (1, n = 30) = 5.21, p < .05, phi = -.50. The other six intermediate 
participants that did not think about the practice reported that it was not an 
intentional act. Ten of fifteen expert participants commented about their high volume 
of reflection on the practice intervention (e.g., “I’d be constantly running through 
things” or “I think it’s always brewing away in the background”). In comparison, 
only two of the nine intermediate participants made comments about the volume 
(e.g., “It was on my mind”). 
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Q2: What were you thinking of mainly? Table 5 details the themes, 
categories, sub-categories, and sample responses. Three themes were identified to 
classify the retrospective thoughts of the participants: monitoring, evaluation, and 
planning. Monitoring statements described observed elements of the practice 
sessions and consisted of two categories: outcome and process. The outcome 
category referred to descriptive comments related to the practice session, such as 
accuracy, score, and ball flight. The process category referred to descriptive 
comments related to the technical act of kicking, the ability to maintain 
concentration, general comments about the practice session, and the elements of the 
session that would transfer to a game situation. Evaluation statements involved 
assessments of the outcome of a kick, the quality of the kicks technically, and 
practice sessions in general, which were again divided into outcome and process 
categories. Planning statements involved goals regarding future kicks and practice 
sessions as well as how previous instances could be learned from to have a positive 
impact on future instances. Again, this theme consisted of the two categories of 
outcome and process. The expert group had more reported instances and more in-
depth responses for monitoring, evaluation, and planning categories with greater 
amounts of outcome and process thoughts for each and their subcategories (i.e., 
technique, practice, concentration, and score) when compared to the intermediate 
group (see Table 3.9). 
Q3: Were these thoughts intentional or were they intrusions? A third of 
the expert group reported that thoughts were intentional only (e.g., “I make a 
conscious effort to think about it”), a third reported having intrusion thoughts only 
(e.g., “just coming into my head, just naturally”), and the other third had thoughts  
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Table 3.9: Frequency of responses across the themes, categories and subcategories, with sample responses for the expert group to Question 2 of 
the post-study semi-structured interview. N.B. Numbers in brackets in bold represent the intermediate data. 
Theme 
(frequencies) 
Categories (f) Subcategories (f) Expert group sample answers 
Monitoring (22) (5) Outcome (2) (2) 
 
Practice (2) (0) 
Technique (0) (2) 
“I would find myself thinking exactly about the session and what happened during the session.”  
 Process (20) (3) 
 
Technique (11) (0) 
 
Practice (5) (3) 
Concentration (2) (0) 
Transfer (2) (0) 
“Just the way I was striking it, I always feel that if I am striking it well then the result will take 
care of itself.”  
“When it (the sessions) is planned, you’re always thinking about it.” 
“Because I was aware of my concentration going in and out from one kick to the next.” 
“That’s probably one of the biggest things I need to work at in a game, my execution in the 
final third. So if I can work at that, it will help me.” 
Evaluation (35) (6) Outcome (25) (5) 
 
Technique (11) (0) 
 
Score (12) (5) 
Practice (2) (0) 
“How it felt when I was kicking, so that even if I got it over, I’d question whether it was a good 
connection or not.”  
“Thinking of the score I got and whether that was as much as I could have got.”  
“Thinking about whether I was happy with the practice.” 
 Process (10) (1) 
 
Technique (4) (0) 
 
Practice (4) (0) 
 
Concentration (2) (1) 
“On Monday’s session I was definitely forcing it more – pulling on it more, whereas on 
Wednesday night it was more controlled and I was getting a better connection.” 
“I think what I realised after the first session was that I didn’t have a clear plan for the session.” 
“So I was thinking of that (concentration), if I did lose concentration, why did I lose 
concentration?” 
Planning (64) (15) Outcome (24) (7) 
 
Technique (11) (1) 
Score (10) (6) 
 
Practice (3) (0) 
“I need more work on my technique so that my accuracy will improve as I go along.”  
“Then you’d be conscious of the score and trying to ensure that you improve it each session.” 
“You’d think about it (practice) again … I need to work on that, or change that, or do a bit more 
of that’ or whatever it might be.”  
 Process (40) (8) 
 
Technique (22) (6) 
 
Practice (14) (1) 
 
Concentration (1) (1) 
Transfer (3) (0) 
“It would be a case of correcting things in your head so that you didn’t do them again the next 
night.”  
“So, you think about the things you want to address in the session and how you want to address 
them.” 
“I’d have a goal for each training session so that I wouldn’t get too distracted.” 
“Just different things like, how can I bring that into a game situation from that.”  
8
3
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that were both intentional and intrusions. Four out of nine intermediate participants 
reported having intentional thoughts only, four out of nine reported intrusion 
thoughts only, and one out of nine reported thoughts that were both intentional and 
intrusions.  
Q4: Where did this occur? Five locations were consistently reported as 
places where reflection occurred. These locations were at home, at bedtime, in 
transit, immediately before or after training, and at work. A greater proportion of the 
15 expert participants reported reflecting upon the practice at home, at bedtime (e.g., 
“I would make it my business to do it [reflect] before I go to bed”), in transit, and at 
work when compared to the intermediate participants (see Table 3.10). In contrast, a 
greater proportion of the 9 intermediate participants reported reflecting upon the 
practice before or after training compared to the expert group.  
 
Table 3.10: The frequency (percentage) of the 15 expert and 9 intermediate 
participants who reported reflecting on the practice sessions at the five locations. 
Group At Home Bedtime In Transit Immediately 
before/after training 
At Work 
Expert 11 (73%) 7 (47%) 8 (53%) 5 (33%) 12 (80%) 
Intermediate 5 (56%) 1 (11%) 2 (22%) 7 (78%) 3 (33%) 
 
Q5: How often in the day and how long did these occur? Responses 
revealed that 14 of the 15 (93.3%) expert participants reflected on their practice 
ssession more than twice a day during the study period (e.g., “I am awake 16-hours 
in a day, it [reflection] would definitely be a few times every hour”). In comparison, 
4 of the 9 (44.4%) intermediate participants reflected more than twice daily during 
the study (e.g., “You couldn’t help but think about it right before the session and 
immediately after the session too”). Responses revealed that 10 of the 15 (66.6%) 
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expert participants reflected for greater than 3-minutes each time they thought about 
the practice session. In fact, 6 of the 15 (40.0%) expert participants mentioned 
reflection durations greater than 8-minutes (e.g., “The bedtime thoughts would last 
about 10-15 minutes”). In comparison, none (0.0%) of the intermediate group 
reported reflecting on the kicking practice sessions for longer than 3-minutes (e.g., 
“Just a couple of minutes before and after the session”). 
Discussion 
The self-regulatory processes of expert and intermediate players during and 
between bouts of deliberate practice in which the goal was to improve kicking 
performance was examined. The expert group rated practice as involving greater 
mental effort and being less enjoyable when compared to the intermediate group, 
supporting these predictions of deliberate practice theory. Moreover, practice was 
generally rated as lower for enjoyment compared to leisure activity. The expert 
group engaged in greater amounts of more detailed self-regulation processes during 
and between bouts of practice when compared to the intermediate group. These 
between-group differences in cognitive processing that occurred during and between 
practice sessions were associated with group differences in kicking accuracy 
improvement. Although both practice groups improved kicking accuracy from pre- 
to post-test, the expert group maintained improvement from the post-test to retention, 
whereas the accuracy of the intermediate group in the retention test returned to pre-
test levels. There was no change in the kicking performance of the expert-control 
group who did not engage in the practice activity. 
Deliberate practice is predicted to be not inherently enjoyable (Ericsson, et 
al., 1993), although debate exists regarding the amount of enjoyment experienced 
when engaging in the activity (for a review, see Ford et al., 2015). The expert group 
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rated their practice as lower for enjoyment compared to the intermediate group, and 
both groups rated the practice as less enjoyable than an activity they chose to do for 
leisure. These findings support the prediction of Ericsson et al. (1993) that 
engagement in deliberate practice will be rated relatively low for inherent enjoyment 
compared to other activities, such as leisure. In the current study, some leisure 
activities were similar in nature to Gaelic football, such as soccer, but they were 
rated higher for enjoyment compared to the practice activity. In addition, deliberate 
practice is predicted to be effortful and greater effort is expected to be associated 
with lower enjoyment (Ericsson et al., 1993). As predicted, the expert group rated 
practice as greater for mental effort compared to the intermediate group and both 
groups rated the practice as more effortful than leisure activity. The expert group 
may have rated practice as less enjoyable because they rated it as more effortful 
compared to the intermediate group. As predicted, the expert group ratings for effort 
(55%) were not different to previous research of a similar standard of performer in 
which they practiced another skill that was highly relevant to improving their 
performance (58%, Coughlan et al., 2014). In contrast, the intermediate group rated 
the practice higher for effort (44%) compared to previous research (31%, Coughlan 
et al., 2014), perhaps because this practice was more relevant to improving their 
performance compared to that in the previous study. These findings support the 
predictions of deliberate practice theory (Ericsson et al., 1993) and some previous 
research (e.g., Coughlan et al., 2014) that engaging in the activity will be less 
inherently enjoyable and more effortful compared to other activities. 
It was predicted that the expert group would engage in more cognitive 
processing, self-regulation, and reflection on the practice activity between bouts 
compared to the intermediate group (Ericsson, 2006; Ericsson & Delaney, 1999; 
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Ericsson & Kintsch, 1995; Jonker et al., 2010; Sonnentag, 1998; Toering, et al., 
2009). As predicted, the SRL-SRS showed that the expert group engaged in greater 
amounts of self-regulation and reflected more on their practice between sessions than 
the intermediate group. This data supports the findings of other researchers using the 
SRL-SRS (Toering et al., 2009; Jonker et al., 2010) who have shown that skilled 
groups demonstrate greater general traits of self-regulation compared to lower-
skilled groups. In addition to this previous work, the current data extend the research 
by showing a positive relationship between self-regulation or reflection and 
performance improvements. All of the expert participants reported in the interview 
that they engaged in processes of self-regulation between practice sessions in 
comparison to only nine of the 15 intermediate participants. Moreover, the expert 
group engaged in this cognitive processing between sessions more frequently, at 
more locations and for longer durations compared to the intermediate group. They 
engaged in more monitoring, evaluating, and planning compared to the intermediate 
group. These data support the idea that experts maintain cognitive control over their 
performances and practice, using long-term working memory to monitor, plan, 
predict, reason, evaluate, and make other inferences towards improved future 
performance (Ericsson & Delaney, 1999; Ericsson & Kintsch, 1995, Sonnentag, 
1998). The expert group engaged in cognitive processes about kicking technique 
more so compared to the outcome of the kicks or compared to other processes such 
as concentration. They also engaged in cognitive processing about technique more so 
compared to the intermediate group. These data support the findings of Cleary and 
Zimmermann (2002) by showing the content of this processing for experts is related 
to technical process-oriented aspects of performance, rather than outcome-oriented 
aspects.  
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The greater cognitive processing between and during practice sessions for the 
expert group was expected to be associated with greater and more permanent 
improvement of the skill when compared to the intermediate and control groups. In 
support of this latter prediction, the expert group improved their kicking accuracy 
from the pre- to the retention test, whereas the other groups did not improve 
accuracy between these two tests. These data support the prediction that greater 
cognitive processing between and during practice sessions is associated with more 
permanent performance improvement. Findings support previous work showing that 
cognitive processing consolidates practiced skills to memory, resulting in more 
permanent skill retention (Brashers-Krug et al., 1996). In contrast to the expert 
group, the control group of experts who did not engage in the practice sessions 
showed no improvement in kicking performance between the tests. Moreover, the 
intermediate group who engaged in less cognitive processing between and during 
practice sessions compared to the expert group improved kicking accuracy between 
the pre- and post-test, but not between these tests and the retention test.  
Findings also support the power law of practice (Fitts & Posner, 1967; 
Newell & Rosenbloom, 1981) which expects improvement through practice to be 
ubiquitous. The findings of this study differ from other research that suggests 
practice should have an external focus of attention (Wulf, 2013; Wulf & Su, 2007) 
and be implicit in nature (Masters & Poolton, 2012) to ensure relatively permanent 
change in performance. However, as Ericsson et al. (1993) suggest that as a person 
moves through the learning continuum, from cognitive to autonomous, in order to 
prevent a period of arrested development, it is imperative to maintain an explicit 
awareness to know when to alter and manipulate a training stimulus to induce a 
performance enhancement. It is also suspected that the attentional demands on a task 
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differ along the expertise continuum (Bernier, Codron, Thienot, & Fournier, 2011) 
and that experts possess the ability to switch from unconscious to conscious 
cognitive processing in order to make adjustments to the skill as required (Carson & 
Collins, 2011). Findings suggest that the expert and intermediate participants may be 
at differing stages along the skill acquisition continuum that requires them to be 
more conscious of their actions before becoming unconscious again as they become 
automated. 
In summary, an expert group of Gaelic football players rated their practice 
greater for mental effort and lower for enjoyment compared to an intermediate 
group, supporting the predictions of deliberate practice theory. The expert group 
engaged in more cognitive processing, self-regulation, and reflection during and 
between practice sessions compared to the intermediate group. These between-group 
differences in cognitive processes were associated with differences in the outcomes 
of practice with the expert group improving their kicking accuracy from pre- to 
retention test, whereas the intermediate group only improved their kicking from pre- 
to post-test, but did not maintain this to the retention test. 
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Chapter 4: Lessons from the experts: The effect of increasing cognitive 
processing and engagement in deliberate practice on intermediate-skilled 
performers 
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Abstract 
Deliberate practice is effortful, not inherently enjoyable, not immediately rewarding, 
challenging, must be adequately resourced, and is underpinned by advanced 
cognitive processing. The aim of this experiment was to examine the effect of 
increasing cognitive processing and deliberate practice in intermediate performers. 
Two matched groups of youth intermediate Gaelic football players practiced a kick 
they identified as most relevant to improving overall performance during an 
acquisition phase and completed pre-, post-, and retention tests. During acquisition, 
participants rated the practice for the deliberate practice tenets of effort and 
enjoyment. In addition, the training group engaged in an intervention to increase the 
cognitive processes of self-regulation before, during and after the practice sessions, 
while a control group did not.  Both groups improved kicking accuracy between pre-, 
post- and retention tests, however, the training group improved accuracy 
significantly more than the control group. The training group rated practice greater 
for mental effort compared to the control group, whilst both groups rated practice 
lower for enjoyment compared to leisure activity. The training group increased 
engagement in the self-regulatory processes of reflection and evaluation as a result of 
the cognitive processing intervention compared to the control group. Findings 
provide support for the theory of deliberate practice and the effectiveness of applying 
the principles of deliberate practice and increasing cognitive processing to expedite 
the learning of intermediate-level youth performers. 
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Introduction 
Deliberate practice is an activity involved in the development and 
improvement of expert performance. The characteristics of deliberate practice are 
that it is effortful, resourced, informative, not inherently enjoyable, not immediately 
rewarding, and challenging in that it is highly relevant to improving an aspect of 
current performance (Ericsson, et al., 1993). The monotonic benefits assumption in 
the theory holds that the number of hours accumulated in domain-specific deliberate 
practice correlates with the level of expertise attained. Data on violinists from the 
West Berlin Music Academy supports this assumption because the standard achieved 
by the best students, lower-skilled students and least-skilled music-teacher students 
was positively correlated to the number of hours of domain-specific deliberate 
practice they had accumulated (Ericsson et al., 1993). In addition, the accumulated 
hours of deliberate practice by age 18 years for the best students, was not different 
when compared with a group of world-class middle-aged violinists at the same age. 
Engagement in deliberate practice is thought to involve concentration and cognitive 
processing, such as planning and evaluating actions and their outcomes (Ericsson & 
Towne, 2010). To date, few researchers have examined the cognitive processes 
associated with deliberate practice or sought to intervene with lesser-skilled 
performers to improve these processes. The aim of this experiment was to examine 
the effect of increasing cognitive processing of intermediate performers during the 
deliberate practice of a skill.  
Researchers examining self-regulation have provided empirical support for 
the role of cognitive processes in expert performance (Anshel & Porter, 1996; 
Kitsantas & Zimmerman, 2002; Zimmerman, 2008). Self-regulation entails the 
cognitive processes of forethought, performance and reflection. Forethought involves 
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goal-setting and planning prior to the task, whereas performance involves attention 
and monitoring of the task and processes. Reflection encompasses the metacognitive 
processes of evaluation and casual attribution during and after the task (Zimmerman, 
2002). Self-regulation enables performers to compare and contrast their actions and 
outcomes to predetermined goals or standards during and between bouts of practice 
(Zimmerman, 1998; 2000). Self-regulated performers are defined as motivationally, 
behaviourally and metacognitively engaged in their personal process of learning 
(Zimmerman, 1986). Expert performers have been shown to engage in self-
regulation in a quantitatively different manner to novice performers. Kitsantas and 
Zimmerman (2002; see also Cleary & Zimmerman, 2001) examined the self-
regulation processes of expert, intermediate and novice volleyball players practicing 
serving. They found that expert players planned their practice routines with more 
advanced strategies (forethought) and evaluated their performance during and after 
practice (reflection) to a greater degree when compared to the lesser-skilled groups. 
Other researchers have predicted and shown that the cognitive processes of expert 
performers are characterised by their ability to encode, index, update and access 
task-relevant information in long-term working memory (LTWM – Charness, 1981; 
Ericsson, 2003b; 2003c; Ericsson & Crutcher, 1990; Ericsson & Kintsch, 1995; 
Ericsson & Towne, 2010; Ward, Ericsson, & Williams, 2013). LTWM enables them 
to build mental representation of future, current or past domain-specific situations 
that allow them to plan, anticipate, monitor, maintain control over, evaluate, and 
improve upon performance and its consequences (Ericsson & Towne, 2010; Ward et 
al., 2013; Ward, Suss, Eccles, Williams, & Harris, 2011). It is assumed that the 
advanced cognitive processes used by expert performers have been acquired through 
practice and experience in a domain (Ericsson & Towne, 2010; Ward et al., 2011; 
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2013), raising the possibility that the acquisition of these processes can occur and be 
expedited for lesser-skilled performers. 
Some researchers have examined how increasing cognitive processing 
influences the acquisition of skill in lesser-skilled performers. Cleary, et al. (2006; 
see also, Singer, Lidor, & Cauraugh, 1993; Zimmerman & Kitsantas, 1996; 1997) 
examined the effect of increasing self-regulation in novice basketball players 
practicing free-throw shots. Participants were divided into five groups, three of 
which were intervention groups and two of which were control groups. The three 
intervention groups were differentiated by the amount of self-regulation they were 
required to engage in during practice. The three-phase group completed a cycle of 
forethought, performance and self-reflection, whereas the two-phase group engaged 
in forethought and performance, and the one-phase group engaged in forethought 
only. One control group practiced without engagement in self-regulation and the 
other group did not practice. Participants in the intervention groups were coached on 
the self-regulation processes they should adhere to during practice. For example, the 
three-phase group were instructed to set process goals (planning), record their 
cognitions on previous throws (evaluating) and record their plans for future throws 
(planning). The study consisted of a 10-trial pre-test, a 12-minute practice session, 
and a 10-trial post-test. Findings showed a positive relationship between the amount 
of self-regulation during practice and free-throw success in the post-test.  The three-
phase (65%) and two-phase group (67%) did not differ in free-throw accuracy in the 
post-test, but both groups were significantly more accurate compared to the one-
phase (43%) and practice-only group (40%). There was a negative correlation 
between self-regulation and the number of trials executed, with more self-regulation 
being associated with fewer trials. This study concluded that an intervention 
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designed to increase cognitive processing improved the acquisition of skill in novice 
performers beyond that from practice alone.  
Although researchers (e.g., Cleary et al., 2006; Singer et al., 1993; 
Zimmerman & Kitsantas, 1996; 1997) have examined the effects of increasing self-
regulation during practice on the performance of novice performers; evaluation and 
adjustments to performance are limited because novice performers are in the early 
stage of learning where a significant amount of thought and attention is required to 
control actions (Fitts & Posner, 1967). For novices, current performance levels 
require large improvements to reach intermediate or expert levels and performance 
improvement should be relatively straightforward (Ericsson, 2003a; Newell & 
Rosenbloom, 1981). However, more explicit thought processes, such as those 
involved in self-regulation, particularly regarding errors in performance, may 
prevent the acquisition of automaticity by these performers in some motor processes 
that characterise more skilled performance (for a review, see Masters & Poolton, 
2012). In contrast, the actions of intermediate level performers are more skilled, 
demonstrate greater levels of automaticity, and are underpinned by more advanced 
cognitive processing (Fitts & Posner, 1967). As such, their performance is closer in 
its characteristics to expert performers when compared to novices. For these 
intermediate level performers, greater improvements may be hindered by their 
competence in the domain leading to a plateau in performance improvement termed 
‘arrested development’ where they are satisfied with their current performance level 
(Ericsson, 2003a). In order to improve performance, these individuals must engage 
in extended bouts of domain-specific deliberate practice (for review, see Baker & 
Young, 2014).  
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In Chapter 2, intermediate Gaelic football players who were able to self-
select their practice of two kicking skills did not engage in deliberate practice, 
choosing instead to practice the skill they were stronger at and experiencing more 
enjoyment and less mental effort, when compared to an expert group. Therefore, it 
appears that intermediate performers must be instructed and guided to engage in 
deliberate practice activity. Moreover, in Chapter 2 and 3, intermediate performers 
rated practice lower for mental effort and engaged in less advanced cognitive 
processing when compared to the expert groups. Findings suggest that intermediate 
performers may require instruction and guidance in order to acquire the cognitive 
processes that characterise expert performance. No researchers have examined the 
effect on skill acquisition of intermediate performers engaging in deliberate practice 
and the advanced cognitive processes of experts.   
The aim of this experiment is to measure the effect of increasing self-
regulatory cognitive processes and the deliberate practice of a kick in Gaelic football 
on intermediate performers. Gaelic football is a national sport in Ireland. It is similar 
to the sport of rugby and other invasion sports with two teams of 15 players on a 
pitch with goals at either end. Participants were guided to self-select the skill or task 
from the game that they wanted to improve and that would most improve their 
overall performance. They practiced this skill or task across four sessions, thereby 
satisfying a key part of deliberate practice theory that the practiced skill should be 
highly relevant to improving overall performance (Ericsson et al., 1993). As such, 
because participants were engaging in deliberate practice, it was expected that they 
would experience its other characteristics. According to deliberate practice theory, 
participants should rate their practice lower for enjoyment and greater for mental 
effort when compared to an activity they do for leisure. Moreover, the effect of 
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practicing a skill relevant to overall performance improvement should be an 
improvement in accuracy of the skill from pre- to post- and retention-tests. In 
addition, participants were divided into two groups that practiced under conditions 
that were differentiated by the amount of cognitive processing. The first group 
engaged in a structured process of self-regulation that ensured they planned, 
monitored and evaluated performance during and between practice sessions, whereas 
the second group did not engage in any structured cognitive processing. The group 
who received the intervention are expected to demonstrate more cognitive processing 
and mental effort during practice, as well as greater self-regulation processes and 
gains in acquisition after practice, when compared to the group who did not receive 
the intervention. 
Method 
Participants 
A total of 34 male youth intermediate Gaelic football players were 
participants. They were split into a training group (n = 17; M age = 16.1 years, SD = 
0.78, M playing years = 9.8 years, SD = 0.97) and a control group (n = 17; M age = 
16.1 years, SD = 0.85, M playing years = 9.9 years, SD = 1.03). After completing the 
Self-Regulation of Learning Self-Report Scale (SRL-SRS, Toering et al., 2012); 
participants were quasi-randomly assigned to groups. Scores were ranked and were 
used to assign participants to groups in a step-procedure. As such, SRL-SRS scores 
did not differ between the training group (M = 21.0 SRL-SRS points, SD = 2.2) and 
the control group (M = 20.8 SRL-SRS points, SD = 2.4), t(32) = 0.30, p = 0.77, d = 
0.10, 95% CI [-1.4, 1.8]. Participants provided informed consent and the research 
was conducted according to the ethical guidelines of the lead institution. 
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Procedure 
 Participants were initially asked to rank the three skills or areas that were 
most important to them in improving their overall performance in Gaelic football. 
All participants chose kicking the ball with their non-dominant foot as most 
important. Participants rated the relevance of practicing the non-dominant kick to 
improving their overall performance using a 10-point Likert scale ranging from one 
or “not relevant at all” to ten or “highly relevant” (M = 9.7 points out of 10, SD = 
0.5). 
Figure 4.1 shows the experimental set-up. Participants were required to 
execute kicks from their hands using the non-dominant foot toward Gaelic football 
goalposts (height = 10m, width = 6.5m, crossbar height = 2.5m) with the intention of 
getting the ball over the crossbar to register a score. Kicks from the hands are used 
frequently in Gaelic football to pass to another team-mate and restart play when a 
foul has been committed, and depending on the location on the pitch an attempt on 
the goalposts is made by the player to score a point.  
 
Figure 4.1: Experimental set-up including Gaelic football goalposts and the ‘out of 
the hands’ kick. Participants could score 1 pt when the ball went over the crossbar 
and between the goalposts, and 0 pts for wide of the goalposts or under the crossbar. 
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Participants were awarded one point if the ball entered between the goalposts 
and over the crossbar. A 4m2 practice zone marked out with cones was created 
directly in front of the goalposts at a distance of 25m. Fifteen standard round-shaped 
Gaelic footballs (O’Neill’s size-5 GAA All-Ireland footballs, Belfast, Northern 
Ireland) were placed on the ground immediately behind the practice zone. A digital 
video camera (Canon Legria FS200, Canon, Tokyo, Japan) was used to record 
performance from 10m directly behind the practice zone. 
The experiment consisted of a pre-test, four practice sessions, a post-test, and 
a retention test, all of which occurred across a three-week period. Both groups 
completed all tests and practice sessions. The pre-test occurred one week prior to the 
practice sessions. The four practice sessions occurred on four consecutive days and 
the post-test occurred on the fifth consecutive day (Shea, et al., 2000). The retention 
test occurred one week after the post-test. The experiment took place in the training 
grounds of the Gaelic football club the participants represented. Prior to the pre-test, 
verbal instructions were provided to each participant regarding the pre-test and 
experimental procedures. The pre-test consisted of 10 kicks toward the goal from the 
hands using the non-dominant foot. Participants engaged in two familiarisation trials 
prior to the pre-test. Following the pre-test, each participant was informed of his 
score, which was calculated as a function of ten points. The post-test and the 
retention test were the same as the pre-test.  
Prior to each practice session, participants were verbally informed by the 
experimenter of their pre-test score and that the goal of the task was to improve their 
pre-test score (Boyce, 1992). Each practice session began with two warm-up trials. A 
practice session consisted of 15 kicks from the hands using the non-dominant foot 
towards the goalposts. The score achieved on every trial was recorded using hand 
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notation by the lead experimenter during data collection, which was checked for 
accuracy against the video footage. Participants were informed to not discuss the 
details of their practice sessions with other participants or people in general. 
Intervention. During the practice sessions, the training group engaged in an 
intervention designed to increase their cognitive processing and self-regulation of the 
practice session, whereas the control group did not engage in this intervention. The 
training group were required to verbally answer three questions after each odd-
numbered trial during their 15-kick practice session (McPherson & Thomas, 1989). 
The aim of these questions was to ensure they engaged in the cognitive processes of 
self-regulation (Cleary, et al., 2006; Ericsson, 2006a; Kolb, 1984; Lee, et al., 1994; 
Schön, 1983). These questions were: (i) briefly describe that kick (performance); (ii) 
briefly describe what was good or bad about that kick (evaluation and reflection); 
and (iii) briefly describe what you could have done and what you will do in the next 
kick (planning and forethought). Monitoring statements during the kick were not 
recorded because the time period of approximately 3 seconds during the kick was too 
short to collect concurrent thoughts (Ericsson & Simon, 1993). In addition, at the 
end of each practice session, the training group answered in written form three self-
regulation questions. The three questions are shown in Table 4.2.  
 
Table 4.2: The self-regulation questions posed to the training group following the 
practice sessions. 
No. Question 
1. What happened in today’s kicking training session? (performance) 
2. What worked well and/or did not work well for you in today’s kicking 
training session? (evaluation and reflection) 
3. What will you do the next time to ensure that you will improve your 
performance? (planning and forethought) 
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Moreover, prior to practice sessions two, three, and four, the training group 
answered in written form the question ‘What will you do in this upcoming session to 
ensure you will improve your performance?’ (planning). In contrast, the control 
group completed a sham questionnaire at this stage about their daily nutrition in 
place of the self-regulation questionnaire. The aim of the nutrition questionnaire was 
to ensure the control group thought the experiment was examining nutrition, rather 
than the effect of cognitive processing. 
Following each test and practice session, a manipulation check (Boudreau, 
Gefen, & Straub, 2001) for self-regulation was administered (Perdue & Summers, 
1986). The manipulation check question was “I kept track of my performance during 
this training session so that I can see which skills I must improve”. The check 
comprised of two other sham questions related to physical effort (e.g., “During this 
session I felt tired, which affected my kicking performance”) in an attempt to hide 
the true nature of the experiment. Each question contained a five point Likert scale 
ranging from “never” to “always”. 
Deliberate practice measures. During the practice sessions, both groups 
completed two valid and reliable self-report measures to rate the tenets of deliberate 
practice for that particular practice session (Coughlan et al., 2014). The mental effort 
prediction was examined using the Rating Scale of Mental Effort (RSME, Zijlstra & 
Van Doorn, 1985). It is a continuous uni-dimensional scale with eight points that 
range from 0 (absolutely no effort; 0%), 75 (considerable effort; 50%), to 150 
(extreme effort; 100%). The enjoyment prediction of the theory was examined using 
the Physical Activity Enjoyment Scale (PACES, Kendzierski & DeCarlo, 1991), 
which is used to examine enjoyment levels during physical activities. It consists of 
18 Likert-scaled comments relating to the current activity with 11 of the comments 
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reverse-scored. Enjoyment scores greater than 65% to 70% are interpreted as higher 
enjoyment, whereas lower scores indicate lower enjoyment (Coughlan et al., 2014). 
Participants in both groups were required to complete each scale following 
engagement in a leisure activity of their choice that occurred on a separate day after 
the experiment period. Table 4.3 shows the leisure activities chosen by the 
participants of both groups. The activity was required to be one they frequently 
engaged in with the focus of leisure, and not for performance improvement. The 
intention was to use the leisure activity ratings to compare against the same measures 
collected during the practice sessions. 
 
Table 4.3: The leisure activities and the number of participants chosen by two 
groups (training, control) to rate for enjoyment and effort. 
Leisure Activity Training Control 
Gym 0 1 
11-a-side soccer  3 0 
Sailing 1 0 
Cycling  1 0 
Golf 1 3 
Computer games 1 0 
Hurling 2 4 
Athletics  3 2 
Tennis 0 1 
Rugby 5 6 
 
Self-regulation measures. Participants in both groups completed the sport-
specific SRL-SRS (Toering, et al., 2012) on two occasions. They completed it at the 
pre-test and for a second time at the retention test to measure the impact of the 
intervention on self-regulation processes. The questionnaire comprises of 18 
questions that related to the reflection (e.g., since yesterday’s practice session, I have 
thought back and evaluated whether I did the right things to become a better kicker) 
and evaluation processes of self-regulation that take place following a practice 
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session (e.g., in each of these practice sessions I try to identify my strengths and 
weaknesses and I think about how I can improve these).  
Data Analysis 
Accuracy data. Mean accuracy scores in terms of the number of successful 
kicks that passed between the goal posts out of the 10 kicks in each test (pre-, post-, 
retention test) or out of the 15 kicks in each practice session were calculated as a 
function of group. Accuracy scores from the tests were analysed using a 2 Group 
(training, control) x 3 Test (pre-, post-, retention test) ANOVA with repeated 
measures on the last factor. Accuracy scores from the four practice sessions were 
analysed using a 2 Group (training, control) x 4 Practice Session (first, second, third, 
fourth) ANOVA, with repeated measures on the last factor. Tukey HSD tests and the 
Dunn-Bonferroni adjustment calculation were used as post-hoc tests where 
appropriate. Cohen’s f formula was used to calculate effect size for measures 
involving more than two means, whereas Cohen’s d was calculated for effect sizes 
involving two means (Cohen, 1988). Values equal to or greater than 0.2, 0.5, and 0.8 
represent a small, moderate, and large effect size, respectively. 
Deliberate practice data. Data from the two deliberate practice scales 
(enjoyment, mental effort) were calculated separately into a single mean score for 
each participant representing the amount of that variable experienced across the 
practice sessions. The scale scores from the practice sessions and from the leisure 
activity were mathematically transformed into percentages to make interpretation, 
comparison, and plotting of data clearer. Percentage scores for the deliberate practice 
scales of enjoyment and mental effort were analysed in separate 2 Group (training, 
control) x 2 Activity (practice, leisure) ANOVAs, with repeated measures on the last 
factor.  
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Self-regulation data. The data from the SRL-SRS reflection questionnaires 
collected at the pre-test and retention test were calculated into an overall mean score 
for each participant that represented their self-regulation value. The mean amount of 
self-regulation was analysed using a 2 Group (training, control) x 2 Test (pre-, 
retention) ANOVA, with repeated measures on the last factor. The data from the in-
practice self-regulation questions were transcribed verbatim using natural speech and 
syntactical markers (Hardy, et al., 1996). Following thematic coding and 
categorisation of the in-practice questions and the inter-session self-regulation 
questions, percentage scores for each category in each theme were calculated. 
The alpha level required for significance for all tests was set at p < .05. 
Results 
Accuracy 
Tests. Figure 4.4 shows the mean number of points scored by the two groups across 
the pre-, post-, and retention tests. Table 4.5 shows the results of the 2 Group x 3 
Test ANOVA conducted on number of points scored.  
 
Figure 4.4: Mean (SD) accuracy scores for the non-dominant kick of the training 
and control groups in the pre- post-, and retention test. 
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There were significant main effects for Group and Test in the predicted 
directions, as well as a significant Group x Test interaction. Post-hoc analysis 
showed that accuracy in the pre-test did not differ between the training (M = 2.2 
points, SD = .88, 95% CI [1.8, 2.6]) and the control group (M = 2.1, SD = .75, 95% 
CI [1.7, 2.5]). However, the training group in the post-test (M = 4.9 points, SD = 1.4, 
95% CI [4.3, 5.6]) and retention test (M = 5.1 points, SD = 1.4, 95% CI [4.4, 5.7]) 
had greater accuracy compared to the control group in the post-test (M = 3.6 points, 
SD = 1.0, 95% CI [3.0, 4.3]) and retention test (M = 3.7 points, SD = 1.0, 95% CI 
[3.1, 4.3]). Both groups improved accuracy from pre- to post-test, and accuracy did 
not differ between the post-test and retention test. 
 
Table 4.5: Results of ANOVA on number of points scored for Group (training, 
control), and Test (pre-test, post-test, retention test). 
Variable & MS dof F p Cohen's 
Comparison 
    
Effect 
     
Size 
Group 21.66 1, 32 7.36 0.01* 0.48 
Test 55.95 2, 64 135.06 0.00* 0.81 
Group x Test 4.13 2, 64 9.96 0.00* 0.56 
Note. ANOVA = analysis of variance 
* p <.05 
 
 Practice sessions. Figure 4.6 shows the mean number of points scored by the 
two groups across the four practice sessions. Table 4.7 shows the results of the 2 
Group x 4 Practice Session ANOVA on number of points scored. There were 
significant main effects for Group and Practice Session in the predicted directions. 
Accuracy improved from one session to the next across the four practice sessions, 
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but the training group were more accurate across practice compared to the control 
group. There was a significant Group x Practice Session interaction. 
 
Figure 4.6: Mean (SD) accuracy scores for the non-dominant kicks of the training 
and control groups in the four practice sessions. 
The post-hoc analysis showed that the training group were more accurate 
across all practice sessions compared to the control group. The training group made 
significant improvements from the first practice session (M = 5.0 points, SD = 1.5, 
95% CI [4.2, 5.8]) to the second practice session (M = 6.4 points, SD = 1.2, 95% CI 
[5.7, 7.2]) and, again, from the second practice session to the third practice session 
(M = 7.7 points, SD = 1.4, 95% CI [7.1, 8.3]). There was no significant difference in 
accuracy between the third and fourth practice session. In comparison, the rate of 
change in accuracy for the control group was slower. The control group showed a 
significant improvement in accuracy from the first practice session (M = 3.9 points, 
SD = 1.6, 95% CI [3.1, 4.6]) to the third practice session (M = 4.9 points, SD = 0.9, 
95% CI [4.3, 5.5]) and, again, from the second practice session (M = 4.4 points, SD = 
1.7, 95% CI [3.6, 5.1]) to the fourth practice session (M = 5.3 points, SD = 1.8, 95% 
CI [4.5, 6.1]).  
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Table 4.7: Results of ANOVA on number of points scored for Group (training, 
control), and Practice Session (1, 2, 3 and 4). 
Variable & Comparison MS dof F p Cohen’s 
     
Effect 
     
Size 
Group 152.47 1, 32 25.28 0.00* 0.89 
Practice Session 30.83 3, 96 32.64 0.00* 0.79 
Group x Practice Session 4.61 3, 96 4.88 0.01* 0.53 
Note. ANOVA = analysis of variance 
* p <.05 
 
Deliberate practice. Figure 4.8 shows the percentage ratings of the deliberate 
practice tenets of enjoyment and mental effort for the training and control groups 
across the four practice sessions.  
 
Figure 4.8: Mean (SD) scores recorded during the four practice sessions using the 
deliberate practice tenets of enjoyment (PACES) and mental effort (RSME) for the 
training and control groups. 
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The 2 Group x 2 Activity ANOVA for mental effort showed a significant 
main effect for Group, F(1, 32) = 10.16, p = .00, d = 0.24. Post-hoc analysis showed 
mental effort across practice sessions was greater for the training group compared to 
the control group. There was no main effect for Activity. There was a significant 
Group x Activity interaction, F(1, 32) = 39.64, p = .00, d = 0.62. Post-hoc analysis 
showed the training group reported greater mental effort during the practice sessions 
(M = 64.1%, SD = 6.5, 95% CI [61.6, 66.7]; great effort, Zijlstra & van Doorn, 1985) 
compared to the leisure activity (M = 48.2%, SD = 10.9, 95% CI [43.1, 53.3]; 
considerable effort, Zijlstra & van Doorn, 1985). In contrast, the control group rated 
the practice sessions lower for mental effort (M = 45.0%, SD = 3.2, 95% CI [42.4, 
47.5]; rather much effort, Zijlstra & van Doorn, 1985) compared to the leisure 
activity, (M = 55.7%, SD = 9.7, 95% CI [50.6, 60.8]; considerable effort, Zijlstra & 
van Doorn, 1985).  
The 2 Group x 2 Activity ANOVA for enjoyment during the practice 
sessions showed no significant main effect for Group, F(1, 32) = 2.682, p = .11, d = 
2.8. There was a significant main effect for Activity, F(1, 32) = 133.42, p = .00, d = 
2.78. The ratings of enjoyment in the leisure activity were significantly greater 
compared to the practice sessions. There was a significant Group x Activity 
interaction, F(1, 32) = 4.78, p = .04, d = 0.43. Post-hoc analysis showed the ratings 
of enjoyment for the practice sessions were not different between the training (M = 
59.6%, SD = 8.2, 95% CI [56.5, 62.7]) and the control group (M = 58.5%, SD = 3.2, 
95% CI [55.4, 61.6]). In comparison, for the leisure activity, the ratings of enjoyment 
were lower for the training group (M = 79.5%, SD = 11.5, 95% CI [74.1, 84.9]) 
compared to the control group (M = 87.7%, SD = 10.2, 95% CI [82.3, 93.1]), F(1, 
32) = 133.4, p = .00. 
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Self-regulation. The 2 Group x 2 Test ANOVA for the SRL-SRS scores showed 
significant main effects for Group and Test in the predicted directions, as well as a 
significant Group x Test interaction. Post-hoc analysis showed no difference in the 
pre-test scores from the SRL-SRS between the training (M = 21.0 points, SD = 2.2, 
95% CI [19.9, 22.1]), and the control group (M = 20.8, SD = 2.4, 95% CI [19.6, 
21.9]). The retention test self-regulation score of the training group (M = 67.7 points, 
SD = 11.5, 95% CI [62.4, 73.0]) was significantly greater compared to the control 
group, (M = 33.1 points, SD = 9.9, 95% CI [27.7, 38.4]). 
Table 4.9 shows the responses of the training group to questions during the 
kicking sessions. In response to the performance question, verbalisations on either 
kick outcome or kick outcome with technique accounted for 96% of all responses. In 
response to the evaluation and reflection question, 81% of all responses were related 
to either technique or kick outcome with technique. In response to the planning and 
forethought question, verbalisations focused on technique for 90% of all responses as 
technique alone, technique with target, technique with concentration, or a 
combination of technique, target and concentration.  
 
Table 4.9: Themes and categories for the training group responses to in-practice 
self-regulation questions. 
Question 1: Briefly describe that kick? (Performance) 
Question 1: Briefly describe that kick? (Absolute evaluation) 
Outcome (86.7%)  “It went wide and to the left”.  
Technique (3.8%)  “Good connection and follow through. Effortless”. 
Outcome & Technique (9.5%)“Snapped at it. Wide and short”.                              
Technique (9.5%) 
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Question 2: Briefly describe what was good or bad about that kick? (Evaluation 
and reflection) 
Outcome (20.0%)  “Still too high, that’s 5 or 6 on the bounce”. 
Technique (62.2%)  “I got under it too much”. 
Outcome &   “Direction was off. Connection and power was good”. 
Technique (17.8%) 
 
Question 3: Briefly describe what you could have done and what you will do in 
the next kick (Planning and forethought) 
Technique (26.9%) “I need to swing my foot around it more and make sure 
I kick through it instead of hooking it”. 
Target (1.2%) “Maybe I should pick a smaller target beforehand. Pick 
a spot behind the goals and kick to it”. 
Concentration (6.3%)  “Take it easy and concentrate more. Calm it down”. 
Technique & Target (22.9%) “I need to focus on the strike and aim to the right 
Target (22.9%)  more”. 
Technique & Concen   “Focus on doing that type of kick again, good power”. 
Concentration (26.5%) 
Target &    “More to the posts with the right body shape. Give it 
Concentration (2.1%)  power with accuracy. Focus on the one kick at a time”. 
Technique & Target & “Follow through higher and to the goals. Take my time 
Concentration (14.1%) and follow through”. 
 
Table 4.10 shows the responses of the training group to the inter-session self-
regulation questions. For the performance question, 91% of all responses related to 
either process alone or process with outcome. Process is defined as focusing on 
procedure rather than the outcome of the action (Zimmerman & Kitsantas, 1996). In 
response to the evaluation and reflection question, 72% of all responses related to 
technique with kick outcome, with a further 25% of the responses being a 
combination of technique, kick outcome and process. In response to the planning and 
forethought question, 90% of all responses mentioned routine, either as routine 
alone, routine with concentration, routine with target, or a combination of routine, 
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concentration and target. Routine is defined as performance-related actions and 
procedures that are repeated for every trial. In response to the pre-session planning 
and forethought question, all of the responses referred to routine, either as routine 
alone, routine and concentration, routine and target or a combination of routine, 
concentration and target. 
 
Table 4.10: Themes and categories for the training group responses to the inter-
session self-regulation questions. 
Question 1: What happened in today’s kicking training session (Performance) 
Process (80.9%)  “I kicked 15 shots with my weaker foot”. 
Outcome (8.8%) “I kicked 5 or 6 over the bar but with the others I 
didn’t connect with them right at all and they sliced off 
to the left”. 
Process & Outcome (10.3%) “Another day of kicks and questions. I got 10 points 
today”. 
Question 2: What worked well and/or did not work well for you in today’s 
kicking training session (Evaluation and reflection) 
Technique (7.4%) “I struck a few nicely when I swung at them. I hurt my 
foot a couple of times from bad kicks”. 
Outcome (4.4%) “Most of my kicks were reasonably good. A few of my 
kicks were quite bad”. 
Process (0.0%)   
Technique &    “I kicked reasonably well. I didn’t kick through the 
Outcome (60.3%)  ball enough. A few dropped short”. 
Technique & Process (2.9%) “Figured a couple of things out today like I need to 
line my shoulder up to the goals and swing across the 
ball to get a good shot away. I snapped at a few of 
them if I did not get myself ready first of all”. 
Outcome & Process (0.0%)  
Technique & Outcome & “Not much. I did score 5 I think. If I aimed for the 
Process (25%)   back of the goals I did better. I rushed some kicks. A 
lot                                            lot of my kicks fell short because I kicked under the 
ball                                          ball too much”. 
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Question 3: What will you do the next time to ensure that you will improve your 
performance (Planning and forethought) 
Question 3: What will you do the next time to ensure that you will improve your 
performance? (Planning) 
Routine (27.9%)  “Try to hit it harder and have more consistency”. 
Concentration (8.8%)  “Continue to focus on my kicks before I take them”. 
Target (0.0%) 
Routine & 3%)  “If I didn’t stop to focus before a kick, it would not be 
Concentration (35.3%) a good kick”. 
Routine & Target (17.7%) “Make sure I don’t lean back when I kick and kick 
right to the back of the goals”. 
Concentration. &   “I need to focus on the goalposts more and          
Target (1.5%)   ready myself for the kick every time. Clear the head”. 
Routine & Concentration & “Concentrate on each kick and follow through to the 
Target (8.8%)   goals every time”. 
 
Question 4: What will you do in this upcoming session to ensure you will 
improve your performance (Planning and forethought) 
Routine (3.9%) “Kick it with more power and get a better connection 
with the ball”. 
Concentration (0.0%)  
Target (0.0%) 
Routine & Concen. (56.9%) “I will take time before my kicks to concentrate on 
Concentration (56.9%) them”. 
Routine & Target (9.8%) “Concentrate on the target and get a smooth strike”. 
Concentration & Target (0.0%) 
Routine & Concentration &  “Take my time and make sure that I don’t lean back”.  
Target (29.4%) 
 
Discussion 
 The aim of this experiment was to examine the effect of increasing cognitive 
processing in intermediate level performers during the deliberate practice of a task. 
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Two groups of Gaelic football players engaged in the deliberate practice of a kick 
from their hands using their non-dominant foot. The training group received an 
intervention during practice designed to increase self-regulatory cognitive processes, 
whereas the control group engaged in practice without this intervention. Both groups 
improved kicking accuracy from pre- to post-test and maintained their improvement 
in a retention test, but the improvement in accuracy was significantly greater for the 
training group compared to the control group. Mental effort was greater across 
practice sessions for the training group compared to the control group, but both 
groups rated the practice sessions lower for enjoyment and higher for mental effort 
when compared to leisure activity. At the retention test, the training group reported 
greater self-regulatory cognitive processes of reflection and evaluation compared to 
the control group and at pre-test.  
Deliberate practice is thought to require cognitive processing, such as 
planning and evaluation, to support performance and improvement of a task (Chase 
& Ericsson, 1980; 1982; Ericsson, Chase, & Faloon, 1980; Ericsson & Towne, 
2010). It was expected that increasing these self-regulatory cognitive processes 
during the deliberate practice of a task would result in greater improvements in 
kicking accuracy by the training group compared to the control group. As predicted, 
the improvement in accuracy between the pre-test and retention test was greater for 
the training group compared to the control group, although both groups 
demonstrated improvements in accuracy across test sessions. In addition, it was 
predicted that the intervention would lead to greater mental effort during practice and 
the use of more self-regulatory processes after practice for the training group 
compared to the control group. As predicted, increasing the self-regulatory cognitive 
processes of the training group during and between practice sessions significantly 
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increased mental effort during and cognitive self-regulatory processes after practice 
when compared to the control group. Findings support Cleary et al. (2006) showing 
the effectiveness of increasing self-regulation during practice as a method for 
enhancing skill acquisition and extends this finding to intermediate performers 
engaging in deliberate practice of a task. Findings provide empirical support for 
predictions about the cognitive processes that underpin expert performance, self-
regulation and deliberate practice (Cleary et al., 2006; Ericsson & Kintsch, 1995; 
Ericsson & Towne, 2010; Zimmerman, 1989). 
 The cognitive processes of expert performers as they engage in performance 
or deliberate practice of a task are thought to involve planning, monitoring and 
evaluation (Cleary et al., 2006; Ericsson & Towne, 2010; Zimmerman, 1989). When 
the training group were required to engage in these processes, the task-specific 
nature of these cognitions was revealed. When evaluating their kick in the inter-trial 
period, the training group predominantly focused upon outcome in terms of the result 
of the kick or technique by describing technical and movement details of the kick. 
When planning the next kick in the inter-trial period, they focused mainly upon 
technique. At the end of each practice session, their answers to the inter-session self-
regulation evaluation questions were process-related referring to the content and 
procedure of the practice session, as well as the technique of the kick and outcome-
related referring to the score they achieved for the session. When planning for the 
upcoming session, their responses always related to routine in some capacity; either 
with concentration, target or a combination of all three responses. While these 
cognitions were task-specific in nature, they demonstrate that the training group 
engaged in planning and evaluation, with cognitive effort and SRL-SRS measures 
suggesting that they did so to a greater degree when compared to the control group. 
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Deliberate practice is predicted to be not inherently enjoyable and effortful 
(Ericsson et al., 1993). It was predicted that because both groups engaged in the 
deliberate practice of a skill they would rate the practice lower for enjoyment and 
higher for mental effort when compared to an activity they did for leisure. As 
expected, both groups rated the deliberate practice sessions lower for enjoyment 
when compared to leisure activity, in accordance with deliberate practice theory 
(Ericsson et al., 1993) and previous studies (Chapter 2 and 3). In addition, the 
training group rated the practice higher for mental effort when compared to the 
leisure activity, again supporting deliberate practice theory. Their rating of mental 
effort during practice was greater compared to the expert groups in previous studies 
(Chapter 2 and 3), probably because of the intervention focusing on cognitive 
processing. In comparison, mental effort for the control group was not different 
between practice and leisure, and their rating for mental effort in practice was lower 
compared to expert groups in previous studies (Chapter 2 and 3). Findings support 
the idea of measuring the tenets of deliberate practice during the activity, as opposed 
to retrospectively, when examining deliberate practice theory.  
 In summary, two groups of youth intermediate Gaelic football players 
engaged in deliberate practice of a kicking skill they selected as the most relevant to 
improving overall performance. Both groups improved kicking accuracy across the 
acquisition phase and retained their improvements to show that learning had 
occurred, but the group who engaged in a structured intervention to increase 
cognitive self-regulation processes before, during and after practice demonstrated a 
greater improvement in retention. This same group rated the practice greater for 
mental effort compared to the control group and both groups rated the practice lower 
for enjoyment compared to leisure activity. Findings support deliberate practice 
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theory and the idea that cognitive processing underpins the performance and 
improvement of domain-specific skills. 
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Chapter 5: Epilogue  
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This chapter will synthesise the work of the thesis and discuss the theoretical 
and applied implications. Potential limitations of the research will be included, as 
well as directions for future research. 
Aims of the thesis 
The main aim of the thesis was to examine how experts learn and the role of 
deliberate practice in that process. Deliberate practice theory holds that the activity 
will be highly relevant to improving an aspect of current performance, effortful, not 
immediately rewarding or inherently enjoyable and involve advanced cognitive 
processes (Ericsson et al., 1993). The retrospective recall methodology used in this 
research is limited by having participants rate activities engaged in a long time ago, 
leading to possible memory recall issues. An alternative method is to measure the 
characteristics, tenets and outcomes of deliberate practice during practice sessions. In 
the current thesis, the tenets of deliberate practice were examined during actual 
practice (Chapter 2, 3 and 4), as opposed to retrospectively, along with the cognitive 
processes that underpin deliberate practice (Chapter 3 and 4), and the effect of 
increasing cognitive processing on the deliberate practice of lesser-skilled 
performers (Chapter 4).  
Participants were required to practice kicking a Gaelic football between 
goalposts. In each study/experiment, the task was administered in a pre-practice-
post-retention test design. In Chapter 2, the aim of the study was to examine the 
approaches of expert and intermediate Gaelic football players as they self-selected to 
practice two kicking skills. The aim was to identify the presence of the tenets of 
deliberate practice through a novel approach of measuring them during the activity. 
In Chapter 3, the aim of the study was to examine the cognitive processes engaged in 
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by expert and intermediate players during and between practice sessions. An 
additional aim was to investigate the role of the relevance of the activity to 
improving performance on practice and its characteristics. In Chapter 4, the aim of 
the experiment was to examine the effect of applying the cognitive processes 
commonly found in expert performers to the practice of intermediate youth 
performers. In general, this thesis was undertaken to examine some of the 
misinterpretations, limitations and inconsistencies surrounding research and 
commentary on the theory of deliberate practice. 
Summary of key findings 
In Chapter 2, the expert group self-selected to practice the weaker of two 
kicking skills, whereas the intermediate group chose to practice the stronger of the 
two skills. The decision to practice a weaker skill by the expert group resulted in 
them rating the practice greater for mental effort and lower for enjoyment when 
compared to the intermediate group, in line with deliberate practice theory. The 
expert group retained their improvement at kicking from pre-test to a retention test, 
whereas kicking performance of the intermediate group in retention was not 
significantly different to the pre-test. Participants used a practice schedule involving 
blocks of five or more trials on one kick-type before switching kicks. 
In Chapter 3, an expert and an intermediate group engaged in the deliberate 
practice of a kicking skill rated as most relevant to overall performance 
improvement. The expert group rated practice greater for mental effort and lower for 
enjoyment than the intermediate group, albeit the intermediate group rated practice 
closer to the tenets of deliberate practice theory when compared to the intermediate 
group in Chapter 2. In addition, participants rated leisure activity higher for 
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enjoyment and lower for mental effort when compared to the practice activity, again 
supporting deliberate practice theory. The expert group engaged in greater amounts 
of cognitive processing through reflecting on their performance before, during, after 
and between practice sessions when compared to the intermediate group. The expert 
group improved kicking performance between the pre-test and retention test. In 
contrast, the kicking performance of the intermediate group was not significantly 
different between the pre-test and retention test.  
In Chapter 4, two matched groups of youth intermediate level performers 
practiced a kicking skill they selected as most relevant to overall performance 
improvement. A training group received an intervention to increase cognitive 
processing before, during and after practice, whereas the control group engaged in 
practice without intervention. The training and control group made significant 
improvements from pre- to post-test and maintained the performance improvement 
in a retention test. However, the training group demonstrated significantly more 
accurate kicking in both the post- and retention test when compared to the control 
group. Moreover, the effect of the intervention was apparent during practice, with 
the training group having significantly greater accuracy following each session 
compared to the control group. Both groups rated the practice in line with the tenets 
of deliberate practice theory, but the training group rated the practice significantly 
greater for mental effort than the control group. The ratings for effort of the control 
group matched similar skilled groups in previous chapters. The training group 
demonstrated greater cognitive processing in terms of reflection and evaluation 
across the experiment; as evident from the SRL-SRS scores at the retention test 
compared to the pre-test, whereas the control group did not increase these processes 
across the experiment. The content of the cognitive processing of the training group 
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showed they engaged in planning, monitoring and evaluation of their progress 
before, during, after and between the practice sessions.   
This section has provided a synthesis of the key findings from Chapter 2, 3 
and 4, with findings showing support for the relevance, effort and enjoyment 
predictions in deliberate practice theory. The subsequent sections will discuss the 
theoretical implications of these findings, as well as the potential limitations of this 
research and future directions. 
Theoretical implications 
From a theoretical perspective, this thesis investigated the theory of 
deliberate practice and its ratings of relevance to improving performance, effort, 
enjoyment, and the cognitive processes that underpin it, as well as applying these 
characteristics to the development of youth intermediate-level performers.  
Ratings of deliberate practice 
Deliberate practice is suggested to be rated higher for relevance and effort, 
yet lower for enjoyment when compared to any other form of practice or activity 
(Ericsson et al., 1993). Limitations exist in the retrospective recall methodology used 
in previous research on the theory. Despite its limitations, a number of concepts 
associated with deliberate practice have been subject to criticism in the literature, 
such as the enjoyment tenet (Helsen et al., 1998; Young & Salmela, 2002) or the 
relationship between accumulated deliberate practice and attainment (Tucker & 
Collins, 2012). Many of the criticisms rely on the retrospective recall methodology 
not confounding data by, for example, including activities in ratings or accumulated 
sums that are not deliberate practice. Researchers are yet to measure the tenets of 
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deliberate practice while it is occurring, which is thought to be a more reliable and 
valid method compared to retrospective recall (Baker & Young, 2014; Coughlan et 
al., 2014). In this thesis, the ratings of deliberate practice have been measured during 
the activity, as opposed to retrospectively. The findings in this thesis showed support 
for the original tenets in deliberate practice theory proposed by Ericsson et al. 
(1993). 
Ericsson (2003a) has clearly stated that not all practice is deliberate, and that 
other types of practice exist, such as maintenance practice. In addition, they 
(Ericsson et al., 1993) have stated that not all performers will be motivated enough to 
engage in deliberate practice and, therefore, many will not. Chapter 2 provided 
support for these ideas by demonstrating that not all performers engage in deliberate 
practice when presented with the opportunity to improve performance of a skill. 
When two groups of Gaelic football players were required to improve their accuracy 
of two different kicking skills, the expert group chose to practice the weaker of the 
two kicks, whereas the intermediate group chose to practice the stronger of the two 
kicks. The expert players rated the practice greater for effort and lower for 
enjoyment compared to the intermediate group, in line with the tenets presented in 
deliberate practice theory (Ericsson et al., 1993). Moreover, expert players 
demonstrated relatively permanent improvement in their skill, whereas the 
intermediate players did not retain performance improvement. Findings support the 
suggestion that not all practice is deliberate (Ericsson, 2003a) and contradicts 
previous research that has included all practice activities when rating deliberate 
practice (Hodges et al., 2004). 
Deliberate practice is an activity engaged in to improve an identified aspect 
of performance and is more effortful when compared to other activities (Ericsson et 
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al., 1993). The ratings for mental effort in Chapter 2, 3 and 4 all supported the theory 
of deliberate practice. In Chapter 2, where both physical and mental effort was rated, 
the expert group rated practice greater for both physical and mental effort when 
compared to the intermediate group. In Chapter 3, expert and intermediate groups 
practiced a kicking skill identified as most relevant to overall improvement. The 
expert group rated the practice greater for mental effort compared to the intermediate 
group, and they recorded similar ratings for mental effort compared to the expert 
group in Chapter 2. The intermediate group in Chapter 3 rated the practice greater 
for mental effort compared to the intermediate group in Chapter 2, suggesting the 
relevance of the activity to performance improvement influences this rating. In 
Chapter 4, two groups of youth intermediate-level Gaelic football players practiced a 
kicking skill they identified as most relevant to overall improvement. The training 
group engaged in an intervention to increase cognitive processes during practice and 
rated the practice sessions greater for mental effort when compared to the control 
group, who did not engage in additional cognitive processing during practice. The 
training group rated the practice higher for mental effort when compared to the 
expert groups in Chapter 2 and 3, whereas the control group rated mental effort 
similarly to the intermediate group in Chapter 3. Overall, findings support the idea 
that deliberate practice is a more effortful activity when compared to other activities 
(Ericsson et al., 1993). 
Deliberate practice is predicted to be less enjoyable when compared to other 
activities (Ericsson et al., 1993). The belief is that the process of attempting to 
improve an aspect of performance is not an inherently rewarding process, and is less 
enjoyable when compared to other activities. Ericsson et al. (1993) hold that the 
motivation to engage in deliberate practice emanates from the desire to improve 
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future performance, rather than enjoyment during the activity. Findings in this thesis 
support the proposition from the theory that deliberate practice is not inherently 
enjoyable (Ericsson et al., 1993) showing that it is rated lower for enjoyment. In 
Chapter 2 and 3, the expert Gaelic football players rated their practice lower for 
enjoyment when compared to the intermediate players. The rating for enjoyment by 
the expert players did not differ between Chapter 2 and 3. In contrast, the ratings for 
enjoyment by the intermediate players were lower in Chapter 3 compared to Chapter 
2, probably because in Chapter 3, they were required to practice the skill that was 
most relevant to overall improvement, whereas in Chapter 2 they were free to self-
select which skill to practice (and chose their stronger skill). In Chapter 4, both youth 
intermediate groups practiced a kicking skill that was rated high for relevance to 
overall performance improvement and there was no difference in their ratings for 
enjoyment. Moreover, their ratings for enjoyment were similar to those for the expert 
groups in Chapter 2 and 3. 
In Chapter 3 and 4, for the first time, enjoyment ratings were compared 
between leisure and deliberate practice activity. Findings supported deliberate 
practice theory (Ericsson et al., 1993) because enjoyment was rated lower in practice 
compared to leisure activity. In Chapter 3 and 4, all groups rated the practice 
significantly lower for enjoyment when compared to leisure activity. These findings 
may support the idea that the social aspects of sport and the bio-psychological effects 
of practice may interfere with the accurate rating of practice enjoyment when done 
retrospectively (Ericsson, 1996; 2004; 2014). Rating practice during the activity may 
provide more accurate perceptions compared to retrospective recall. Overall, practice 
rated as most relevant to improving overall performance was rated lower for 
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enjoyment compared to other activities, supporting the enjoyment tenet in deliberate 
practice theory (Ericsson et al., 1993). 
Deliberate practice is an activity that requires analysis of current performance 
and identification of rate-limiting factors to further improvement (Ericsson et al., 
1993). Central to this process of analysis is that the aspect identified and practiced is 
highly relevant to overall performance improvement. The method applied in Chapter 
3 and 4 may be the first time participants have been required to select a skill as most 
relevant to overall improvement before rating it for the tenets of deliberate practice. 
Findings from these studies support the relevance aspect in the theory of deliberate 
practice. In Chapter 3 and 4, when participants selected the skill for practice that was 
most relevant to overall performance improvement, the ratings of practice resembled 
the expected ratings in deliberate practice theory (Ericsson et al., 1993). In contrast, 
the intermediate performers in Chapter 2 practiced their stronger, rather than weaker 
skill, and their ratings were different to those for deliberate practice. In Chapter 3 
and 4, not only was the practice selected as being most relevant to improving 
performance, but significant performance improvement in kicking accuracy was also 
shown between pre- and post-test measurements, demonstrating the relevance of the 
practice to improvement. In studies using the retrospective recall methodology, 
practice activities rated as highly relevant to improving performance (e.g., mat work 
for wrestlers in Hodges & Starkes, 1996) may not have led to actual performance 
improvement or been the most relevant to performance improvement. Therefore, the 
ratings of effort and enjoyment for these activities may be for less relevant activity 
than is indicated in these studies. In addition, the method of retrospectively rating 
activities that have been engaged in some time ago into a single aggregate score 
might lead to changes in perceptions or misperceptions for effort and enjoyment 
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(Baker & Young, 2014; Coughlan et al., 2014). Overall, in this thesis, when an 
aspect of performance was rated as most relevant to and led to performance 
improvement, it was rated as effortful and not inherently enjoyable, supporting the 
theory of deliberate practice (Ericsson et al., 1993).  
Cognitive processing and deliberate practice 
Experts engage in more advanced cognitive processing compared to lesser-
skilled performers (Ericsson & Kintsch, 1995; Ward et al., 2011) and their acquired 
domain-specific knowledge enables more efficient planning and evaluation of their 
actions (Ericsson & Lehmann, 1996). The cognitive processing required to engage in 
deliberate practice is suggested to be greater than other practice activities (Ericsson 
et al., 1993). In addition, expert performers are believed to engage in practice-related 
cognitions away from the practice environment (Jonker, Elferink-Gemser, de Roos, 
& Visscher, 2012). However, researchers have not examined such cognitive 
processing during and surrounding deliberate practice. Findings from Chapter 2 and 
3 confirmed that expert performers engage in the advanced cognitive processing of 
planning and evaluating performance to a greater degree than lesser-skilled 
performers. In Chapter 2, evidence for advanced cognitive processing was provided 
when expert players made more monitoring and planning verbal report statements 
compared to the intermediate group, whereas there was no difference between 
groups for evaluation statements. In Chapter 3, the SRL-SRS scale measured the 
intensity of practice-related cognitive processing engaged in between practice 
sessions. The SRL-SRS scale scores of the expert group were significantly higher 
than the intermediate group, indicating they were more cognitively engaged in the 
process away from the practice environment. The interviews also revealed that 
cognitive processes between practice sessions were greater for expert compared to 
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intermediate players. Findings extend the research on deliberate practice theory by 
providing evidence of advanced cognitive processes during and surrounding 
deliberate practice in expert performers. 
Researchers have shown that the cognitive processes of self-regulation have a 
positive impact on performance and learning (Cleary et al., 2006, Singer, Flora, & 
Abourezk, 1989; Singer et al., 1993). For example, Cleary et al. (2006) showed how 
a group who engaged in a complete cycle of self-regulation experienced greater 
improvement in shooting accuracy in a basketball free-throw task when compared to 
groups who did less or no self-regulation. However, the effect of cognitive 
processing from self-regulation has not been examined during deliberate practice. 
Findings from Chapter 4 showed significantly greater improvements in accuracy by 
the training group from pre-test to retention test compared to the control group, who 
also improved from pre-test to retention test but not to the same degree. These 
findings support the research of Cleary et al. (2006) and extend it to show that 
increasing cognitive processing during deliberate practice enhances performance 
improvement in intermediate performers. Findings extend the theory of deliberate 
practice by showing a positive effect on performance improvement from 
implementing a self-regulatory cognitive processing strategy with intermediate 
performers.  
The development and utilisation of advanced cognitive processing may be 
linked to expanded working memory capacity (Ericsson & Towne, 2010), but 
researchers have not detailed the content of the cognitive processing of performers 
during practice. Chapter 4 is the first time that the content of cognitive processing 
during deliberate practice was examined. Findings show that the cognitions elicited 
from the evaluation questions for the training group were mainly outcome and 
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technique-related statements, whereas the cognitions from the planning question 
were mainly process, routine, and concentration. Findings may provide evidence 
showing the type of cognitive involvement during deliberate practice outlined by 
Ericsson & Towne (2010). In their theory, expert performers counteract the 
development of automaticity by engaging in more complex cognitive processing of 
the type found in Chapter 4 in order to maintain greater control over performance 
and learning. It appears that the intervention led to the training group engaging in 
this processing to a greater degree than the control group, which led to the between-
group differences in skill learning, supporting the hypothesis in deliberate practice 
theory.  
The current thesis examined cognitive processing during deliberate practice 
through verbal reports, SRL-SRS analysis and semi-structured interviews, and for 
the first time examined the impact of increasing cognitive processing on intermediate 
performers engaging in deliberate practice.  Overall, the current thesis has extended 
the theory of deliberate practice with its findings relating to cognitive processing and 
its effect on deliberate practice. 
Practice scheduling 
Permanent changes in performance are usually greater from random practice 
schedules compared to blocked practice (Ali, Fawver, Kim, Fairbrother, & Janelle, 
2012; Goode & Magill, 1986; Immink & Wright, 2001; Kaefer, Chiviacowsky, 
Meira Jr., & Tani, 2014; Kitago & Krakauer, 2013; Lee & Magill, 1983, Shea & 
Morgan, 1979). Researchers are yet to examine the effect of practice scheduling on 
performers engaging in deliberate practice. Moreover, the theory of deliberate 
practice refers to repeated repetition of tasks as a performer targets a specific 
 129 
 
element of their performance for improvement (Ericsson et al., 1993), which 
suggests a more blocked practice schedule.  
The current thesis is the first time that practice schedule has been linked to 
the theory of deliberate practice and examined for its effect on performance and 
learning. The findings from Chapter 2 appear to contradict the research on practice 
schedule (e.g., Goode & Magill, 1986; Kaefer, et al., 2014). The expert group used a 
hybrid practice schedule, electing to practice a kick for a set of 5 or more 
consecutive trials at least once before switching kicks, which was closer to blocked 
than random practice. In addition, the few intermediate players that experienced 
improvements in performance and at retention also chose this hybrid practice 
schedule. In Chapter 3 and 4, participants practiced one skill, and so engaged in a 
blocked practice schedule. In these chapters, kicking accuracy improved 
significantly between pre- and retention tests. Findings appear to contradict previous 
research on practice schedule (e.g., Shea & Morgan, 1979). However, practice 
schedule was not an independent variable in this thesis that systematically differed 
based on theory, whereas it was in previous research (e.g., Ali et al., 2012). 
Therefore, the conclusion about which practice schedule is superior for learning for 
expert or intermediate performers remains unanswered. One suggestion is that the 
effect of cognitive processing through self-regulation between trials may be 
sufficient to induce a form of contextual interference, leading to greater learning 
when compared to less or no processing between trials (Jelsma & van Merriënboer, 
1989).  
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Limitations and future research 
The current thesis explored various concepts related to how experts learn and 
extended the research on the theory of deliberate practice. As with all research, 
answers to specific hypotheses were established, but with some limitations, which 
leaves numerous questions to be investigated by future research. The following 
section addresses those limitations and suggests directions for future research. 
Deliberate practice theory 
 Some of the concepts associated with deliberate practice have been subject to 
criticism by other researchers, such as the monotonic benefits assumption (Tucker & 
Collins, 2012) and the enjoyment tenet (e.g., Hodges & Starkes, 1996). The 
scientific interrogation of theories and concepts is an important part of their 
development, and should be encouraged. This thesis has provided valid data to 
address some criticisms of the theory, such as the enjoyment tenet. However, it has 
not addressed key criticisms related to the monotonic benefits assumption, such as 
the idea that accumulated deliberate practice accounts for all of the variance in 
attained performance. To do so using the method from this thesis would require a 
longitudinal study in which deliberate practice characteristics and outcomes are 
measured across an extended time period. Longitudinal research is difficult to 
conduct given the time constraints of research funding and postgraduate 
qualifications. 
 In addition, a central part of deliberate practice theory is its predictions about 
motivation. It holds that the motivation to engage in deliberate practice emanates 
from the belief that it will improve future performance, rather than it being 
immediately rewarding, or inherently enjoyable (Ericsson et al., 1993). The use of 
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enjoyment as a prediction about and to measure motivation, as was used in this thesis 
and other research assessing the theory, appears to be less developed as a concept 
when compared to research on motivation. Researchers examining motivation have 
considered multiple concepts that contribute to it, including task versus ego 
orientations and motivational climates (e.g., Duda et al., 1995); basic psychological 
needs including competence (Vallerand & Reid, 1984), and autonomy and 
relatedness (e.g., Ryan & Deci, 2000); hierarchical needs including self-
actualization, belongingness, and safety (e.g., Maslow, 1943) and intrinsic versus 
extrinsic motivational factors (e.g., Deci, Koestner, & Ryan, 1999). The 
development and improvement of expert performance clearly requires high levels of 
motivation over an extended period of time. However, researchers in this area, 
including in the theory and in this thesis, have not created well developed theories or 
testable hypotheses about the motivation of expert performers, beyond those outlined 
in deliberate practice theory. In future, the motivation of aspiring and current 
performers should be detailed in a comprehensive theory with testable hypotheses 
that includes, but is not limited to, those outlined in deliberate practice theory 
(Ericsson & Charness, 1994; Yeo & Neal, 2004). 
Transfer of skill acquisition from practice 
The transfer of skill acquisition from practice to improved competition 
performance should be the key consideration when designing practice. A limitation 
of this thesis is that the transfer of skill acquisition from practice to competition or 
competition-like conditions was not assessed. The lack of match-based transfer tests 
in this thesis limits conclusions about the improvements in performance (Chapter 2 
and 3) and the cognitive processes underpinning performance and its acquisition 
(Chapter 3 and 4). Skill acquisition and the transfer of improved performance from 
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practice to competition requires measurements of competition performance before 
and after an intervention. One method in Gaelic football would be to conduct 
performance analysis on the use and success rate of non-dominant kicks from the 
hands over the course of a number of competitive matches before and after an 
intervention. In addition, for example participants could retrospectively recall their 
thoughts whilst observing video footage of the match to determine the cognitive 
processes that underpinned the performance. A potential limitation of measuring 
performance in competition is the confounding effect of contextual factors such as 
weather conditions, venue, and opposing team characteristics. Therefore, multiple 
matches or simulated matches would need to be used in measurement to reduce the 
effect of these contextual factors. Similar ideas have been expressed about the need 
to transfer skills acquired from perceptual-cognitive skills training using 
representative tasks to improve real-world performance, such as by researchers 
examining offside decision making in association football referees and assistant 
referees (Catteeuw, Gilis, Jaspers, Wagemans, & Helsen, 2010; Catteeuw, Gilis, 
Wagemans, & Helsen, 2010) and others (Broadbent, Williams, Causer, & Ford, 
2015). 
In this thesis, the cognitions made during deliberate practice appeared to be 
relatively explicit in nature and the outcome of an explicit knowledge-base. Other 
researchers have shown that an implicit knowledge-base leads to more robust motor 
skill execution compared to an explicit knowledge-base (Masters & Poolton, 2012; 
Poolton, Masters, & Maxwell, 2006). Typically, the accumulation of implicit or 
explicit knowledge across practice has been measured in transfer tests that assess the 
extent to which explicit rules underpin motor skill execution, such as dual-tasks or 
high anxiety conditions. A limitation of this thesis is that no dual-task or high 
 133 
 
anxiety transfer tests were included to assess the accumulation of explicit 
knowledge. In future, for example, groups could engage in a dual task, such as tone-
counting during acquisition, as per Maxwell, Masters, & Eves (2000), to identify 
whether engaging in intense, task-specific bouts of deliberate practice places 
different cognitive demands on an individual compared to other forms of practice 
(Geeves, et., 2014; Toner & Moran, 2014; 2015; in press). Alternatively, Causer, et 
al. (2011) tested their findings on the kinematics and visual attention of elite-level 
shotgun shooters using a high anxiety transfer test. High anxiety conditions were 
created by comparing test scores against other participants, as well as having 
financial rewards for the top three finishers. The effects of high anxiety can be 
measured with sensitive equipment, such as positron emission topography (PET 
scan), functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI), electroencephalography, 
galvanic skin patches, heart rate monitors, pupil dilatometers and blood pressure 
cuffs to measure the psychophysiological differences of attention, anxiety and focus 
between performers of varying skill levels (for a review, see Janelle, Duley, & 
Coombes, 2004). Such transfer tests may reveal the resilience of the cognitive 
processes occurring during deliberate practice and whether they differ to cognitive 
processes found in other practice conditions. Overall, there is a need to capture and 
test the naturally occurring performance, acquisition and cognitive processes of 
expert performers in realistic ecological settings (Ericsson & Ward, 2007; Ericsson 
& Williams, 2007; Ford, Coughlan, & Williams, 2009; Williams & Ericsson, 2005). 
Practice scheduling  
 The blocked practice schedule used by participants in this thesis led to effects 
that contradict practice schedule research showing that blocked practice is more 
effective during acquisition but the effects of random practice are greater in retention 
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(Lee, 2012). It seems that when participants are able to self-select their practice 
schedule, they choose a blocked order, as opposed to a random order (Wu & Magill, 
2011), which contradicts the work of those who have shown systematic increases in 
contextual interference with skill acquisition benefits further acquisition (Porter & 
Magill, 2010; Post, Fairbrother, & Barros, 2011). Such a finding warrants further 
investigation to determine whether a random practice group in Chapter 3 and 4 
would have resulted in even stronger effects in retention compared to the blocked 
practice schedule used by the groups. The findings for blocked practice in this thesis 
may support previous research (Jelsma & van Merriënboer, 1989; Shea & Zimny, 
1983) showing that intense engagement in a task causes variations from trial to trial 
that create a contextual interference effect. Recent neuroscience research using fMRI 
(Cross, Schmitt, & Grafton, 2007; King, Hartley, Spiers, Maguire, & Burgess, 2005), 
kinaesthetic imagery (Fourkas, Bonavolonta, Avenanti, & Aglioti, 2008), 
transcranial magnetic stimulation (Lin, Fisher, Winstein, Wu, & Gordon, (2007), 
kinematic analysis (Lin, Fisher, Wu, Ko, Lee, & Winstein, 2009) and psychometric 
testing (Ackerman & Beier, 2006) has advanced understanding of the neural 
adaptations that occur from different practice schedules. The application of such 
methods may provide neuroscientific data regarding the brain regions involved in the 
cognitive processes that underpin deliberate practice.  
Ratings of deliberate practice 
Chapter 2, 3 and 4 supported and extended the research on the ratings of 
deliberate practice through the use of a novel method of data collection within the 
practice environment. This method provided participants with the opportunity to 
isolate their rating of the practice and prevent other variables such as the outcome of 
accumulated practice sessions to interfere with the perception of the practice and 
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counter the suggested interference of retrospective recall (de Bruin et al., 2014). A 
limitation of the current thesis is that it investigated the ratings of deliberate practice 
of a kicking skill in Gaelic football and not in any other tasks, sports, or domains. 
Therefore, the generalizability of the findings from the novel method of data 
collection used in this thesis has not been examined. Future research should use this 
method to examine deliberate practice in other sports, tasks and domains. It may be 
possible to examine how this method differs to retrospective recall by having 
participants rate the same or similar practice some time later, such as a month or a 
year later, to determine how the practice is perceived across time-points. 
The current thesis examined, supported and extended the enjoyment tenet of 
the theory of deliberate practice by comparing ratings of it with leisure activity. 
Findings contradict those who suggest that deliberate practice is inherently enjoyable 
(Hodges & Starkes, 1996). However, the range of activities chosen by the 
participants included intense activities such as rugby, as well as some less intense 
activities such as golf. Future research should control for the intensity of the leisure 
activities to equate them to the effort of the deliberate practice activity under 
examination; this may provide a more accurate comparison of the ratings between 
the deliberate practice activity and the leisure activity. 
Importance of the work for other domains 
 The findings from this thesis may translate to how performers engage in 
deliberate practice in other domains, such as medicine (Causer, Barach, & Williams, 
2014; Ericsson, 2007c), military (Ward, Farrow, Harris, Williams, Eccles, & 
Ericsson, 2008; Williams, Ericsson, Ward, & Eccles, 2008), education (Ashby-Plan 
et al., 2005), law enforcement (Ward et al., 2011), pilot training (McKinney & 
 136 
 
Davis, 2003), and simulation training (Ward, Williams, & Hancock, 2006). In 
particular, the medical domain has embraced deliberate practice as a concept that can 
enhance training and application of skills in areas including surgery (Crochet, 
Aggarwal, Dubb, Ziprin, et al., 2011; Ericsson, 2011; McGaghie, 2008), medical 
education for undergraduates (Moulaert, Verwijnen, Rikers, & Scherpbier, 2004), 
emergency medicine (Wayne, Butter, Siddall, Fudala, et al., 2005) and nursing 
(Ericsson, Whyte, & Ward, 2007). Findings in this thesis about the cognitive 
processing of expert performers, as well as the method used of measuring 
performance before and after deliberate practice bouts, could translate to other 
domains, such as medicine.   
Applied implications 
Deliberate practice as a practice tool 
The data presented in this thesis show how experts learn, how they continue 
to improve their performance beyond its current level, and how their practice and 
learning mechanisms can impact on the performance of youth intermediate 
performers. Therefore, the applied implications of this thesis impact experts, 
intermediates, coaches, and mentors.  
The theory of deliberate practice states that it plays a significant role in 
differentiating expert from lesser-skilled performers in a domain (Ericsson et al., 
1993). In recent versions of the theory, the notion of “arrested development” has 
been included to describe the plateau in performance that occurs for many 
performers (Ericsson, 2003a; 2003c; 2007a). Some performers become competent at 
a task or domain and are satisfied to remain at that current level of performance. In 
contrast, current and future expert performers are not satisfied with being merely 
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competent and, as a consequence, they plan and engage in deliberate practice 
activities that are highly relevant to improving their current performances and their 
weaknesses. The domain of sport has many examples of professional athletes who 
perform to their strengths only and pass through an entire professional career with 
obvious weaknesses to their game (e.g., a soccer player with the inability to shoot for 
goal using both feet competently. Findings in Chapter 2 and 3 showed the 
importance for already established expert performers to continue to engage in 
deliberate practice to avoid “arrested development”, to ensure performance remains 
superior to competitors, and to potentially achieve eminence (Ericsson et al., 1993). 
Researchers had not examined the effect of applying deliberate practice to 
lesser-skilled performers and this thesis presented novel data in this regard. As 
Chapter 2 and 3 showed, intermediate Gaelic football players did not practice in a 
manner that either resembled deliberate practice or maximised the effect of 
deliberate practice. In the absence of direction, intermediate performers chose less 
effective practice strategies, such as practicing skills they were already relatively 
competent at or did not cognitively engage in the task to a sufficient level. Therefore, 
the findings of Chapter 4 in which a training group engaged in deliberate practice 
confirms the potential benefits for coaches, athletes and mentors of having 
intermediate performers engage in structured deliberate practice activities. One of 
the difficulties in having performers engage in deliberate practice, particularly for 
multiple bouts across an extended period of time, is ensuring motivation to engage 
remains high. As this thesis has shown, in support of the theory, deliberate practice is 
rated lower for inherent enjoyment compared to other activities. Therefore, repeated 
engagement in deliberate practice activities has the potential to become de-
motivating because inherent enjoyment is lower. Coaches and significant others must 
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apply other strategies to ensure long-term motivation remains high, such as focusing 
on longer-term goals related to achievement. Such motivational strategies may be 
particularly important in a deliberate environment (Ford, Hodges, & Williams, 2013) 
where all of the decisions in a performer’s life are goal-directed towards 
performance improvement and achievement including those within and away from 
the practice setting.  For example, recovery activities between training sessions (Gill, 
Beaven, & Cook, 2006), video analysis (Helsen, et al., 1998), nutrition (Kerksick, 
Harvey, Stout, Campbell, Wilborn, Kreider, et al., 2008), and reflective practice 
(Richards, Collins, & Mascarenhas, 2012). Of course, for younger athletes these 
activities should be introduced incrementally in line with their increased interest and 
commitment levels up to and including the elite level (Bullock, Gulbin, Martin, 
Ross, Holland, & Marino, 2009). This process provides a significant challenge to 
coaches and mentors to create an environment where individuals are motivated to 
immerse themselves in goal-directed activities within and away from the training 
environment. 
Findings from this thesis support the construct that not all practice is 
deliberate (Ericsson, 2003a). Previous research on deliberate practice has included 
all forms of practice in their accumulations and ratings of deliberate practice, which 
may have led to overestimations of how much deliberate practice was engaged in 
(Hodges & Starkes, 1996). These other forms of practice, such as maintenance 
activities and match-play, are important elements of training sessions but lack the 
characteristics required to qualify them as deliberate practice (for exceptions, see 
Catteeuw, et al., 2009; MacMahon et al., 2007). Furthermore, not everyone is suited 
to or requires engagement in deliberate practice. The monotonic benefits assumption 
has led to the popular belief that the start of engagement in deliberate practice in a 
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sport should occur very early in childhood. However, in the theory, Ericsson et al. 
(1993) explicitly outline a pre-deliberate practice phase of participation. The first 
phase of participation in a domain was argued to “. . . begin with an individual’s 
introduction to activities in the domain and end with the start of instruction and 
deliberate practice” (Ericsson et al., 1993, p. 369). It was proposed that “. . . 
interested individuals need to be engaging in the domain and motivated to improve 
performance before they begin deliberate practice” (p. 371). Therefore, novice and 
child performers do not need to engage in deliberate practice. Play activities that are 
engaged in for fun and enjoyment are more suited to novice performers to increase 
skill acquisition and the likelihood of their participation in the sport for an extended 
period of time (Côté, Baker, & Abernethy, 2007). 
Concluding remarks 
 In conclusion, this thesis provided an in-depth examination of the theory of 
deliberate practice, showing how experts learn and how their mechanisms and 
strategies impact the practice efficacy of lesser-skilled performers. Research on 
expertise and in particular deliberate practice has received considerable attention in 
the last 20 years (Baker & Young, 2014). The current thesis addressed some of the 
limitations in that literature, such as the ratings of relevance, effort, and enjoyment of 
deliberate practice. The thesis used a novel method of data collection to determine 
the presence of the tenets of deliberate practice during practice, as opposed to 
retrospectively. In Chapter 2 and 3, the expert performers improved a skill highly 
relevant to overall performance improvement and rated the practice higher for effort 
and lower for enjoyment, when compared to intermediate performers. In addition, 
the thesis extends previous research from the deliberate practice literature concerning 
the cognitive processes of expert performers (Ericsson & Towne, 2010), showing 
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their greater engagement in planning, monitoring, and evaluation of performance. 
Moreover, in Chapter 4, when intermediate performers were required to engage in 
these cognitive processes during deliberate practice they improved performance 
beyond that of a group who engaged only in deliberate practice. This thesis will 
hopefully act as a catalyst for future research in several different areas from both a 
theoretical and applied perspective. For example, the link between practice schedule 
and deliberate practice must be investigated as it could have theoretical and applied 
implications for researchers and practitioners. Overall, the findings in this thesis 
have corroborated and extended the literature on the theory of deliberate practice and 
how experts learn. 
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